


The European Union and Norwegian Human Rights Policies Towards Zimbabwe: Motives and Implications

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Department of Political Science, Peace and Conflict Studies Programme,
University of Oslo, Norway, 2010

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Studies**

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Having received help from all these stakeholders, this book was made possible. The position expressed in this publication is my position and does not necessarily reflect the views of the above mentioned entities and /or personalities. I take responsibility for shortcomings that might be in the arguments expressed herein and if I get to know of the shortcomings, I will attempt to improve the situation.

Thank you

Ocean Marambanyika

University of Oslo, Norway, 2010.

About the Author,

Ocean Marambanyika is a scholar on issues related to political science, history, development, commerce and indigenous people rights. He worked at the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) Southern Africa Regional Office from 2002 to 2003. Among others, he has worked as a Trainee at the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights in 2009 as well as a Trainee in Human Resource Management at the G4S Secure Solutions AS in Norway in 2010. Ocean holds a Bachelor Degree in History and Development Studies from the Midlands State University as well as a Master of Philosophy Degree in Indigenous Studies from the University of Tromsø in Norway. He is an Associate of the Institute of Bankers in Zimbabwe and has a Diploma in Banking. He also has a Diploma in Human Resource Management from the Institute of Administration and Commerce in South Africa/Zimbabwe. This research is submitted for his Master of Philosophy Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo in Norway.

Abstract

Central to this research is an analytical discussion of the motives and implications of the European Union and Norwegian human rights and democracy policies towards Zimbabwe. In discussing this it is vital to understand the human rights and land histories of Zimbabwe. It is equally significant to understand that relations between Zimbabwe and Norway and the European Union go a long way back. Zimbabwe is currently facing challenges related to deficits in human rights and democracy. How can one best understand such challenges in Zimbabwe? It is worth to note that the challenges in Zimbabwe should be understood in a historical context of the land and human rights pasts. In the colonial Zimbabwe land was racially divided and the human rights of other sections of her population were more important than other groups in the same country. The situation was almost the same as in South Africa's apartheid system. Knowing that this is part of what explains today's agonies in Zimbabwe is critical in facing the challenges the country has today. The post colonial administrators in the country exploit such a history as a political tool to prolong their rule. The consequence has been that human rights and democracy have suffered. Where do The EU and Norway come in?

Do the EU and Norway have genuine intentions to promote democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe? This book discusses the human rights policies of the EU and Norway towards Zimbabwe. Both the EU and Norway seem to have toughened their stance on Zimbabwe from the year 2000 after the country embarked on the land reform programme. They both imposed sanctions and financial restrictions against Zimbabwe in the name of promoting good governance. To push for the agenda to promote human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe both EU and Norway have partnered with NGOs to pressure and expose the administration in Zimbabwe. What are the motives for so doing? This work asks why the EU and Norway did not demand the government of Zimbabwe to make sure that all people in the country must have equal access to arable land soon after independence in 1980. It also poses the question of why did the EU and Norway not significantly condemn the loss of life in the period between 1981 to 1987 in Zimbabwe. And why are they condemning the post 2000 era and not all the eras before then? Is it that the EU and Norway are interested in promoting their self economic and strategic interests at the expense of genuine human rights in Zimbabwe? This research work argues that such a possibility is a legitimate explanation of the motives of the EU and Norway in Zimbabwe? This is all about international realism and the desire by stronger nations to dominate the weaker states. Can this justify the suffocating human rights set up in Zimbabwe today? Definitely not, argues the essay.

Weaknesses in the EU and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe have helped the Zimbabwean government to hang on to power despite some objections from a major section of its population. By imposing sanctions, the EU has been accused by the government of being itself responsible for the economic downturns in the country. The EU has failed to send a clear and consistent message that land is a key factor in tackling the human rights and democracy issues in Zimbabwe. By failing to do so, the Zimbabwe authorities have been

quick to appeal to fellow African nations to help defend Zimbabwe from imperial motives of the EU and Norway alike.

Do the EU and Norway have genuine motives to help Zimbabwe? Indeed this work also argues that both Norway and the EU see Zimbabwe as platform to promote the western values of fairness, freedom, democracy and the respect for human rights. Most of these basic things are lacking in Zimbabwe today. Where does the EU and Norway differ? The essay argues that whilst Norway advocates for dialogue and engagement to tackle the human rights challenges in Zimbabwe, the EU's position is much tougher. The Norwegian approach towards Zimbabwe can therefore be critical in influencing the EU and Zimbabwe to resolve their differences and consequently help in the democratization process in Zimbabwe. That both the EU and Norway have genuine intentions for the situation in Zimbabwe to be democratic has been underlined in this discussion and it will remain so.

CHAPTER I

On the Research, Theory and Methodology - An Introduction

Significance of this research topic

At this particular era, most mentions of the name Zimbabwe provokes mixed feelings of a successful story gone wrong. For some Zimbabwe represents all that needs to be done in the reconfiguration of meandered colonial pasts. To most of the western European nations, Zimbabwe represents a test of foreign policy directions. For most African nations as well as the so called third world nations, this country portrays a story of good, courage and excesses. The cross cutting influence of Zimbabwe's situation to the contemporary global regimes makes it a significant case for research. Entertainment is not what defines the significance of this case study; rather it is its far reaching implications for development and foreign policy lessons that shape it into a truly relevant study area. Links between Europe and African nations have been long, fruitful and sometimes antagonistic. One of the most controversial and influential links has recently been the relations between Europe and Zimbabwe. This relation has reinvigorated the desire for a proper understanding of what really shapes the European interests in African governance systems. It has begged the question of whether Europe is really interested in assisting Africa to develop or whether it is after its own self interests. Recent events in Zimbabwe have provided an opportunity to revitalize this debate using Zimbabwe itself as case study. It has been the vociferous reactions to Zimbabwe's events from the European Union and sister nations like Norway under the banner of human rights that attracts research interest on what is behind the European motives on Zimbabwe. In recent years big events like the Europe-Africa summit were cancelled based on the different policy positions between European and African nations on Zimbabwe's situation. Furthermore relations of the recent past between France, Portugal and the United Kingdom have been shaken by their sometimes

differing positions on the way forward on Zimbabwe. When Sweden took over the EU presidency in 2009 its suggestions on dealing with Zimbabwe sparked some arguments within the EU on Zimbabwe. Relational complexities within the EU and between the EU and Africa have sometimes largely been caused by the perceived volatile governance system in Zimbabwe. Bad governance is not limited to Zimbabwe; rather it is widespread among all nations of the globe. The interest that the perceived bad governance in Zimbabwe has attracted from the EU and western nations and others is what makes it even more vital to do a research that endeavors to dig the motives behind the human rights and democracy policies of the EU and Norway towards Zimbabwe. This is what this research is designed to undertake.

Research question:

What are the motives and implications of the EU and Norwegian human rights and democracy policies towards Zimbabwe?

- a. Is the EU and Norway interested in preserving their self interests in Zimbabwe or in promoting genuine human rights and democracy*
- b. What are the implications for such motives*

Research Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The EU and Norway are interested in promoting their self interests in Zimbabwe.

Hypothesis 2: The EU and Norway are interested not just in self interests but also in promoting genuine democracy in Zimbabwe.

Research Objectives

Central to the objective of this research is an endeavor to analyze the motives behind the EU and Norwegian human rights and democracy policies towards Zimbabwe. As a consequence the research will analyze the implications of the EU and Norwegian

policies towards Zimbabwe. The objective of this paper is to ask and analyze whether the EU and Norway are pursuing self interests in Zimbabwe or whether they are interested in genuinely promoting democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. The potential differences between Norwegian and EU motives will be analyzed.

Justification for the Research:

I justify the necessity of such a research based on a number of issues. I believe that the Zimbabwean case is a test case for the current and future EU-Africa relations in many ways. The success or failure of the Zimbabwean actions will be a roadmap for former settler colonies in Africa to follow. Hypothetically, the African nations are using Zimbabwe as a traffic robot to test the probable implications of certain policy directions in certain policy areas rooted in center-periphery politicking. Hence this kind of research will try to make a genuine empirical and academic display that Norway and the EU needs additional information on this area. The struggle for peace and democracy in Zimbabwe is deeply rooted on the colonial and post-colonial democratic related complexities that this project seeks to merge into the analysis of the EU and Norwegian human rights policies. Norway, EU and Zimbabwe need to understand each other better. They need to know what lies behind the way they relate in an effort to improve corporation between them. It is hoped this research will help build that platform for further understanding between these nations.

Methodology

Researching on political issues poses some dilemmas in terms of choice of research methods. Nevertheless in a typical social scientific research such as the one which is the basis of this paper, it was prudent to employ the qualitative approach. Qualitative methods generally refer to several distinctive research activities: participant observation, intensive/in depth interviewing, and focus group discussions (Chambliss Daniel F et al, 166: 2006). In this paper the interviewing technique was the more dominant method employed. The decision not to employ other methods was based solely on their inappropriateness to the type of research I was undertaking. As

Silverman noted, no method of research, quantitative or qualitative, is intrinsically better than any other (David Silverman, 6: 2005). He goes on to note that there are no wrong or right methods- there are only methods that are appropriate to your research topic and the model with which you are working. (David Silverman, 112: 2005). In my case it was the qualitative method which was better placed to answer my research question of what are the policy motives of the EU and the Norwegian state towards Zimbabwe's human rights situation. Chambliss noted the salience of qualitative methods by stating that qualitative research aims to go where people live and thereby become at its best form, a form of literature, beautifully teaching its readers the deeper truths of the human condition. (Chambliss Daniel F et al, 188: 2006). In as much as this might hold value it does not however discard the possibilities within other methods. With a great deal of time it will be possible to carry out a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology if one wishes to expand the scope of the research on the relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union. This is a possibility left to future research gaps on this area. Within the family of qualitative research I decided to focus specifically on employing the interview method, the historical method and the comparative approach which will be explained briefly below. These methods are suited to argument each other and in trying to put the study and research questions into context and understandability.

Personal in-depth interview techniques

One of the most widely tried and tested research methods is the interviewing technique. Interviews have been a traditional social scientific and anthropological approach in undertaking social and political science research. Their traditionality seems to endure the test of times. In this paper interviewing formed a great deal of the methodology as it sought to probe and get an understanding of what lies behind the conduct of relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the EU. This is what Rubin and Rubin noted regarding the use of intensive interviews: "Often we wonder what individuals think or feel, or how they see their world. For this purpose one can use intensive interviews or in-depth interviewing which relies on open-ended questions to

develop a comprehensive picture of the interviewee's background, attitudes, and actions- to listen to people as they describe how they understand the worlds in which they live and work". (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:3 in Chambliss et al, 180: 2006). My research approach followed this thinking in that my questions were open ended and designed to solicit relevant responses to what the research questions needed to uncover. Intensive interviewing is a technique which is sometimes referred to as in-depth interviews or unstructured interviews. Intensive interview is employed by Lofland and Lofland (1995) as alternative to the term unstructured interview and Spradley uses the term ethnographic interview to describe a form of interview that is more or less synonymous with the unstructured interview. (Bryman Allan, 113: 2008). In an unstructured interview the interviewer typically has only a list of topics or issues, often called an interview guide or aide memoire, that are typically covered and the style of questioning is typically informal and the phrasing and sequencing of questions will vary from interview to interview (Bryman Allan, 113: 2008). In this paper these approaches were employed. It was felt that having an unstructured interview will produce better results for the research. It was possible to get in depth information by asking a question like "why do you think Norway promotes human rights in Zimbabwe" or "why do you think the EU ties aid to human rights in Zimbabwe". These questions will give the respondent reasonable space to explore various possibilities and by so doing it was possible to get a lot of information on a variety of issues regarding the research questions. In one of my previous researches I noted that open ended interviews gives room to obtain insights beyond one question only but into other variables which the research seeks to investigate. (Marambanyika Ocean, 6: 2008). It was thus found appropriate to use open ended in-depth interviews in this research based on the great possibilities it had to offer in terms of answering the research questions.

In depth Telephone Interviewing

Telephone interviewing was one of the methods employed in this research. I chose this method based on the geographic spacing of the informants I wanted to reach. Besides, this method is convenient in terms of costs and time management. Thus Allan Bryman pointed out that the advantage of telephone interviews over personal interviews are that on a like for like basis they are far cheaper and also quicker to administer especially if the sample is geographically dispersed. (Bryman Allan, 115: 2008).

Historical method

As an attempt to set the research into context this paper employed the historical method approach. Using history makes it possible to introduce the case area in a way that readers will make sense of where the research is coming and going. In this case the historical method makes it possible for readers to have a brief background of the historical relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union. It also makes it possible to have a historical overview of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and the general history of the European Union foreign policy which will provide the basis to analyze the theme of the research. Pointing out the significance of history in research, Acton in his work of October 1896 to the syndics of the Cambridge University Press on the work which he had undertaken to edit implied history to be a unique opportunity of recording, in the most useful to the greatest number, the fullness of the knowledge which the 19th century was about to offer, (Carr Edward Hallet, 1 : 1962), whilst Carr noted that history consists of a corpus of ascertained facts and the facts are available to the historian on documents, inscriptions and the historian collects them , cooks them and serves them (Carr Edward Hallet ,6 : 1962). In the 1830s, Ranke remarked that the task of the historian was “simply to show how it really was (Carr Edward Hallet, 6: 1962). In summary terms using history in research is crucial part of making the research understandable and setting it into context. Thus the decision to employ this method was partly based on this premise.

The case study and Comparative method

In this research the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe have been chosen as cases for the study. Zimbabwe is specifically the point case on which the EU and Norwegian policies will be analyzed. On the other hand it can be noted that the EU and Norway are cases that will some how end up being compared. Though it is not a bigger intention of the research to compare and contrast the EU and Norwegian policies, it will be inevitable to deliberate on the similarities and differences between the Norwegian and the EU approaches in dealing with the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. Thus a comparative analysis approach is very important in social science research. Charles Ragin thus pointed out that comparison provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical criteria, (Ragin Charles C, 1: 1987). In an attempt to note the significance of comparative research Swanson went to the near extremes by highlighting that “thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And, in the absence of comparison, so is all thought and scientific research” (Swanson 1971:145 in Ragin C, 1: 1987). In the analytical sections of the paper it will be noted that the comparative aspect will feature reasonably were necessary.

Secondary Methods

Central to the research methods for this paper was the use of secondary data. This entailed references to published articles, books, electronic data and other related secondary literature. Secondary literature forms part of the body of sources that will be amalgamated with the primary interview data to inform the analysis in this paper. In fact most arguments in this research will build on information available through published works and then attempt to bridge the knowledge gap by merging the secondary and primary data analysis.

Purposive and theoretical sampling

Part of the challenges in interview research is the sampling part of the deal. It is a challenge to come up with a list of informants who might be representative of the questions the research intends to answer. In this research I employed the purposive sampling approach which is described by Bryman as essentially strategic and entails an attempt to establish a good correspondence between research questions and sampling- in other words, the researcher samples on the basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research. (Bryman Allan, 333-34: 2008). This approach partly resemble my approach in this research as I deliberately chose to interview informants I thought have relevant knowledge on the foreign and human rights relations between Zimbabwe, Norway and the European Union. On theoretical sampling approach, Bryman noted that it entails sampling interviewees until your categories achieve saturation and selecting further interviewees on the basis of your emerging theoretical focus (Bryman Allan, 334: 2008). Regarding the theoretical sampling I was choosing some of my informants based on some issues that emerged from a previous interview but strictly related to my research. Thus the sampling was a mixture of purposive and theoretical sampling and in this case the distinction between these two was blurred.

The research sample:

The following are the informants conducted for the research:

The former Prime Minister of Norway and President of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, Kjell Magne Bondevik- He was the Prime Minister of Norway from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005. He is the longest serving non-Socialist Prime Minister in Norway since 1945. He is now the President of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is located in Norway. I scheduled an interview with Mr. Bondevik via Tone Holme who is the Administrative Secretary at the Oslo Center. The interview took place on 25 March 2010 at the main Oslo Center offices. It was purposely and rightly thought that Mr. Bondevik has a wide range of knowledge to discuss the Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe and the possible

motives behind such policies. Hence the decision to have Mr. Bondevik as a vital informant was based on this approach.

A university academic on history and human rights in Zimbabwe Sabelo Gatsheni Ndlovu – He was a lecturer of African History at the Midlands State University in Zimbabwe and a lecturer at the Ferguson School of African and Oriental Studies at Oxford University in the United Kingdom and he wrote a number of articles in Journals of African Studies. He has written a number of books on the History of Zimbabwe alongside Zimbabwean experts like Terrence Ranger. At the time of the interview he was planning to join the South African Institute of International Affairs. As it turned out to be, it was correct decision to conduct Doctor Gathseni for a discussion on the EU and Scandinavian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It was thus deliberate to ask Dr. Ndlovu for his contribution as he turned out to be very valuable on the subject as well as being partly representative of the coalition government's position on the EU and Norwegian policy towards Zimbabwe.

A former active member of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) - Victor Chimhutu- Like in many other countries, the student movement is a very influential political force in Zimbabwe. In fact the largest opposition political party before the coalition government in Zimbabwe was a conglomeration of labor and student movements. Victor Chimhutu was a student activist in the Zimbabwe National Students Union between 2000 and 2006. He studied a Psychology and Public Administration at the University of Zimbabwe and is currently studying for a Master in Gender in Development at the University of Bergen in Norway. The decision to make him part of the informants was based on the perception that his views might be partly representative of this branch of society in Zimbabwe.

An Academic researcher at the European research center at the University of Oslo (ARENA), Marianne Ridevold - Marianne is PhD fellow at the center for European research and she provided a general discussion on the EU make up. Though the discussion with her was not necessarily on EU- Zimbabwe relations, it provided a

basis to understand the dynamics of policy making within the EU which is relevant in writing of issues related to the European Union.

Former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and emergency relief Coordinator and current director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Jan Egeland - I conducted Mr. Egeland via his personal secretary and she notified me that he was having a busy schedule. I had earlier personally talked to Mr. Egeland when we met at a local conference in Oslo and he had indicated that he will be willing to discuss Zimbabwe with me when my research begins. I was however content with having received a free copy of a chapter written about his previous meeting with President Mugabe in a book entitled “a billion lives”. His thoughts in that chapter will be helpful in giving a bird’s eye view on perceptions of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Utenriksdepartementet) - I tried to conduct the Africa or Zimbabwe section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and they gave me links to their website which they thought can be usable for my research questions. I intend therefore to analyze and utilize the information on their website in the paper.

Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary General and Nobel Peace Prize Winner. I had a brief discussion with Kofi Annan during an international meeting in Oslo in February 2009. I intend to refer to his thoughts on the subject under research.

Wangari Mathai, the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Winner and a Kenyan Environmental activist. She was a deputy Minister of Environment and Natural Resources in Kenya between 2003 and 2005. . I met her at the World Environmental Day celebrations in June 2007 in Tromsø, Norway. I intend to refer to her thoughts on human rights in Zimbabwe.

Methods and research validity

The methods chosen for the study were designed to provide a high degree of validity in responding to the research questions. Validity is concerned with whether a variable measures what it is intended to measure (Bollen 1989:184 in Adcock Robert and Collier David, 530:2001). Further Adcock and Collier notes that measurement validity is specifically concerned with whether operationalisation and scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock Robert and Collier David, 529: 2001). The variables chosen as tools of analysis in this paper ensure reliability and validity of the research outcome. The outlined methods were thus premised to correlate with the research questions and variables like sanctions and human rights are tools in EU and Norwegian foreign policies towards Zimbabwe that will make it possible to analyze the motives and implications of such political approaches.

Research challenges

The research process has not been without challenges. One of the sizeable challenges has been at a personal level as a researcher. Having grown up in one of the most politically volatile periods in post independence Zimbabwe fraught with political propagandas from the competing political parties, it required enormous energy to maintain political objectivity. My everyday life in Zimbabwe was a time in which the media and information channels were controlled by the state. In the last decade the state controlled media had been at pains to portray many western policies as neo colonial. This poses a challenge in social research which discusses relations between a developing nation like Zimbabwe and western blocs like the EU and Norway. However this challenge has been overcome through my long years studying issues of governance, development, conflict and objectivity in social scientific research. Despite having spent a great deal living in an environment of hostile relations between EU and Zimbabwe, I find great pleasure in sticking to ethics of research objectivity as a way of fighting off this challenge.

Challenges in reaching informants in far away places led me to use the telephone interviewing techniques. Discussing the issue of Zimbabwe-EU relations is in itself a very sensitive issue in Zimbabwe. This applies when it comes to getting political leaders to sit down and openly discuss political issues. It is even a challenge for the people inside Zimbabwe to accept to openly discuss the government in a negative way with researchers. This has been partly as a result of the political violence experienced in the last decade or so which made people suspicious of political issues. However there are still some in the academic and political movements who are willing to discuss politics. This necessitated my decision to have informants from the academia and student movements from Zimbabwe as they find it relatively agreeable to discuss their thoughts on politics in Zimbabwe. By so doing I attempted to overcome challenges of getting respondents to talk politics in Zimbabwe. For some it might not sound too political to discuss the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe, but as a result of the political propaganda in Zimbabwe, the EU is a big political issue because of the significance of its influence in the country.

Ethical framework

Most of my informants were people involved in politics and academics and as such there was no big issue regarding anonymity. Most of the informants had no objections to being mentioned as who they are in the paper's analysis. I promised to make available the final product of my research to some of the respondents and i intend to do as such.

Literature review

Works that are devoted to the analysis of the motives and implications of the European Union and Norwegian human rights policies on Zimbabwe have been scant. Available literature on corporation between Zimbabwe and the EU have generally been located with the general analysis of relations between the EU and Africa as stipulated under the Lome Convention and the successor Cotonou Agreement. The Norwegian academic interest on the subject of Zimbabwe has been relatively limited when

compared to the areas like West Africa, East Africa and South Africa. The Norwegian academic and development corporation interests have of late been largely focused on countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, Botswana, Zambia and Ghana. This can partly explain the relatively low focus on analyzing Norwegian Zimbabwe relations. The deteriorating political climate in Zimbabwe may also have been a factor in limiting academic research on Zimbabwe. Yet despite the reduced academic involvement on Norwegian Zimbabwe relations, the significance of Zimbabwe in impacting the relations between Africa and the western European nations has even increased. Hence the need to do more on this area as this paper seeks to do.

As the European commission director general for information noted, the rights and obligations flowing from the Lome convention and its successors have dominated Zimbabwe's partnership with the EU. (European Commission report, 2: 1997). The report goes on to mention development and humanitarian assistance that the EU has been supplying to Zimbabwe. The information in the EU reports is significant for research on EU development assistance to Zimbabwe. However the data in the reports is shy on going towards an empirical analysis of the motives and implications of the EU human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. This paper seeks therefore to build on this data to analyze the utilization of this development assistance as a human rights policy with some possible motives behind it. On its website the European delegation in Zimbabwe remarks that "the European Commission (EC) actively supports the promotion of governance, democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe" and that the EC is also cooperating with different types of Zimbabwean Non State Actors (NSAs) in constituting a more democratic Zimbabwean society (delzwe.ec.europa.eu). This information is very important for researches on Zimbabwe though in itself this available information from the EU lacks the academic analysis of the whole social scientific agenda behind the chosen relational approaches between EU and Zimbabwe. This research attempts to build on such data in making an analysis of the realist and rationalist intentions of the EU towards Zimbabwe.

In a book entitled *The EU and Africa: The restructuring on north-south relations* William Brown pointed out that the Lome relations have formed a part of a wider pattern of north-south relations (Brown W, 39: 2002). In this work the focus is on general relations between the EU and Africa and despite some sections on Zimbabwe, there is no deeper analysis of the motivational dimension of the relationship between Zimbabwe and the EU. In another article Perez wrote that the conflict between Zimbabwe and EU clearly goes beyond what can be addressed through consultations under the Cotonou Agreement (Mercedes Garcia Perez: 115-6: 2007). In this article Perez made an effort to discuss the EU and Zimbabwe within the context of the current impasse based on the dispute over the legitimacy of the elections held from the year 2000. Perez's work is fruitful in partly understanding the EU politics on elections in Zimbabwe though it still does not go beyond to discuss the possible motives behind the respective EU policies in its relations with Zimbabwe.

In a 1997 evaluation report Hilde Selbervik noted that Norwegian aid policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe is of course embedded in the overall South policy of Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Evaluation report 7.97: 1997). In this report and related reports the presented picture deliberates on Norwegian aid policies towards developing countries. The reports provide salient information on comprehending the Norwegian aid policy. It has been the lack of a specific discussion on the real politick of the Norwegian Zimbabwe human rights cooperation in these existing works that has prompted this research to take a step further to bridge this gap.

As will be noted throughout the paper a variety of secondary literature will be employed in attempting to bridge the knowledge gap on understanding the motives and implications of the EU and Norwegian democracy and human rights policies towards Zimbabwe. The paper will analyze existing the literature's positions on EU, Norwegian and Zimbabwe relations and attempt to merge interview and primary data in answering the research question under discussion. The brief literature overview given in this section is typical of many other literatures on the subject in terms of their usefulness and limitations. This paper is therefore motivated by the desire to integrate

the available information on the subject with the data that has been researched to shed new light on the directions of the cooperation between Zimbabwe, the European Union and Norway.

Theoretical Framework

Central theories and concepts within the field of realism and liberalism will inform the theoretical framework of this thesis. The international relations theories of realism and liberalism have emerged as offering relevance in analyzing the motives and implications of the European Union and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe.

Realism and liberalism can be thought of as traditional approaches to security and just because they are labeled traditional does not mean they have been replaced by more recent thinking (A. Collins 2007:p5). Some students of international politics believe that realism is obsolete- True if the conditions that a theory contemplated have changed , then it no longer applies- But what sort of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? (Waltz, 2000:5). Given this implied go ahead from Collins and Waltz, this thesis will employ realism and liberalism as its theoretical basis for analysis in this paper.

Realism Theories

Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau are some of the classical scholars who laid down the modern foundation of the theory of realism. According to Doyle these philosophers hold that the best description of world politics is a jungle characterized by the constant possibility of wars and this possibility requires that states follow 'real politick', i.e., be self interested, prepare for war and calculate relative balance of power (Doyle,2007:18). Historically this thinking heralded the quest for massive international colonization of nations by other nations substantiated by the Darwinism philosophy. Further Doyle points out a thought provoking argument which reads:

realist moral philosophy holds that individuals should accept the `national interest` as an ideal, a one true guide to the formulation of the public policy of states in the dangerous international system (ibid. :19). Can it be argue that the Norwegian and EU foreign policy in general has been guided by this policy especially also in relation to Zimbabwe? Can the Norwegian and European publics have been generally made to submit to this national interest thinking by the European statesmen and can these populaces have been made to believe that the political set up in Zimbabwe, if allowed to go unpunished could set up an unparalleled threat to international European interests throughout its former colonies across the globe and especially in Africa? This might potentially be the EU view on the realist based side. The Norwegian and EU commission statements that will be analyzed in the chapters on Norwegian and EU's policies and positions on Zimbabwe will help to explore these questions and arguments.

Further arguments in the works of John Mearsheimer are of salience to the arguments to be advanced in this paper. He says "great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. The system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core". (Mearsheimer: 2001:29). He further says that "states operating in a self help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self help world". (ibid.33.). The EU is composed of member states that have decided to come together in the hope that the togetherness might bring them a part realization of their search for global hegemony and fulfillment of their self interests. In realist terms the argument by Mearsheimer might hold a large degree of validity in its relation to Zimbabwe. If left unchecked, the direction of Zimbabwe's domestic policies might pose an immediate and long term threat to the EU security interests. Even the EU member states have tried at several stages to bring the Zimbabwe issue to the UN Security Council pointing out that this little nation poses a threat to international security. If that was

true, then to borrow from Mearsheimer, the security dilemma reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. (ibid. :35).

Liberalism and Normative theories

Liberal ideals are traced to the historical works of Locke, Kant and others. Doyle points out that the liberal theorists see the world political dynamics differently from the realist assumptions. As Doyle notes, liberal's view of the world is that of a cultivatable `garden`, which combines a state of war with the state of peace. (Doyle, 2007:19). According to the liberals, as noted by Doyle, a state's interests are determined, not by its place in the international system, but which of the interests, ideals and activities of its members captures governmental authority. (Doyle, 2007:19). Indeed this liberal argument is equally essential in analyzing the EU policy objectives towards Zimbabwe. Attempts to see the EU policy as merely based on realist paradigms might be flawed as the practical EU position might be a blended mixture of the demands of the freedom ideals of its populaces as well as the realist demands of its realist political statesmen. The interests of human rights oriented groups and publics in Europe might have led the EU to adopt a rational/genuine demand of a European style human rights regime in Zimbabwe. If this is the case then the theories of realism and liberalism can be used to search for an analytical understanding of the EU/Norwegian foreign and human rights policy approaches towards Zimbabwe. On a similar issue regarding the normative side of the EU foreign policy, Helene Sjursen, in her article on "The EU as a normative power: how can this be?", posed an interesting question of how can we know that the EU's pursuit of norms is legitimate?. (Helene: 2006:1). Helene further noted that the conception of the EU as a normative, civilizing, ethical and civilian power is contested (ibid.:1). In pursuit of understanding the EU policy motives towards Zimbabwe such questions might be interesting to pursue as they might unravel deeper meanings behind their relations between the EU and Zimbabwe.

A contrast made by Robert Kagan as quoted by Helene is interesting for the purposes of the argument in this paper. Arguing that the Europeans come from Venus and the Americans from Mars, Kagan establishes a contrast between the realist US, which relies on military power and subscribes to a perspective on international relations consistent with a so-called Hobbesian war of all against all, and the EU's 'Kantian' approach, focusing on 'soft' civilian means. This proposition begs the question of where then can Zimbabwe in particular come from. We can say probably it comes from Mercury, a planet so small and so close to the solar system that observing and understanding it becomes difficult. Yet Zimbabwe is not difficult to understand and yet it's so small but yet so critical in those entities like the EU which might be interested in African foreign policy and power balancing.

Further on the EU national interests and Liberal Idealist theories

Jaane Matlary in her book on EU Security dilemmas pursued a notable argument which is of relevance in discussing the EU policy on Zimbabwe. Her argument is a general foreign policy position carried out by the EU but it has an insight into the emphasis that the general public and politicians in Europe pursue different agendas in their human rights policies towards other nations. Matlary argues that the relevance of the domestic policy level (within the EU) has become very important, if not the most important factor in decision making (Matlary, 2008:3). Further Matlary says that security was always a province for the elite, the few who had special insights and special mandates – Now everyone takes an interest: NGOs, the media, the clergy, women's groups and so forth (Matlary:2008:3-4). This approach is useful in understanding the liberal theory perspective on the EU's position on Zimbabwe. The EU can not be understood without delving into what makes the EU an entity. Its people and its political institutions are what make the EU an EU. Thus in the liberal perspective, interest groups in form of NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have become some of the most vocal constituencies pressing for

genuine concerns for EU to press for a democracy and human rights agenda in Zimbabwe.

Matlary has noted that the dominant theory of security studies- which is realism- rules out the importance of domestic factors in foreign policy and dismissed them, (Matlary:2008:4). This position is implicitly propagated by Patrick Morgan when he says that regardless of the explanation, realists have long depicted security as endangered by aggressive, revisionist, or revolutionary states. Hence the essence of international politics is competition for power, with power consisting ultimately of coercive capabilities. (Patrick Morgan in Collins, 2007:19). It will thus be interesting to discuss the dynamics of relations between the realist paradigm and domestic pressures on policy making in the EU approach towards Zimbabwe.

Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones in EU) are peaceful in relation to one another- this is Immanuel Kant's point (Waltz, 2000:7). In light of this position can one say that the EU position on Zimbabwe is partly derived on the EU's perception of Zimbabwe as not being a right kind of democracy? Under the democratic peace model or theory, which is a branch of the liberal theories, might it therefore be a justifiable argument to say that the EU considers Zimbabwe's rulers as undemocratic and thus justify the unwillingness to cooperate with its regime which does not qualify to be part of the right league of democracies? The issue of perceptions on what a democracy is was fine tuned by John Owen when he argues that democracies that perceive one another to be liberal democracies will not fight (Owen in Waltz, 2000:7). Wayward democracies are especially tempting objects of intervention by other democracies that wish to save them (Waltz, 2000:9). Zimbabwe's rulers argue that they are a democracy which has been holding elections constitutionally since the attainment of independence in 1980. Can the EU politicians have been of the view that Zimbabwe ceased to be a functional democracy? Has the EU's policy therefore become a punitive approach towards a wayward democracy which has gone wrong and a democracy that needs rehabilitation? If the EU genuinely see Zimbabwe as undemocratic and is trying to

make it a real democracy, why then should the EU human rights policy to Zimbabwe not be considered to be rational and genuine?

The sections that follow will analyze these questions and arguments further based on official EU and Norwegian pronouncements thorough public statements, official documents, secondary sources and some interviews gathered during the course of researching for this paper.

Organization of the Study

An analytical and historical presentation of the human and land rights issues in Zimbabwe will be undertaken in chapter 2. This chapter will also give an overview of the historical relations between the EU and Zimbabwe as well as between Norway and Zimbabwe. The discussion in this chapter will be helpful in informing the arguments to be advanced in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 will be an analytical discussion of the research findings concerning the motives and implications of the European Union human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It will discuss the tools employed by the EU in dealing with human rights issues in Zimbabwe. The fourth chapter will analyze the Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe and the motives and implications of such a policy. The tools that Norway has deployed to deal with Zimbabwe will also form the discussion in this chapter. In this chapter there will be a comparison of the Norwegian approach vis-à-vis the EU approach in tackling the human rights challenges in Zimbabwe. The last section will be a conclusion of the whole research which will give recommendations or a possible way forward for relations between the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe. This section will wrap up with a summary of most of the arguments raised in this research.

CHAPTER 2

Zimbabwe as a case study- Human Rights, Land and Foreign Relations.

A story of a fairy tale might arguably be one of the proper ways of writing the story of Zimbabwe and its international relations. Its domestic policy might too fit the fairy tale category. But the domestic policy of this nation has been largely shaped by its international relations regime, in as much as the international friends and foes of Zimbabwe have been made to react to the domestic policies of the country. Why is Zimbabwe a typical fairy tale in the third world context? Well her history, geographical location, natural resources as well as human resources have been of strategic significance in both the sub-continent and to the entire spheres of great power politics. In a recent article in the influential Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom, one of Africa's most prominent figures, the wife of Nelson Mandela, Graca Machel, pointed out that "that's one of the issues, particularly with the British people: because of the emotional attachment they have with Zimbabwe, in many cases they define the continent in terms of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is one country among 53 countries, so you have all the rest of 52 countries". (The Guardian Newspaper: 18.04.10). On a similar tone, a notable writer, William Brown, highlighted that Zimbabwe is a special case: Zimbabwe's independence differed from the general pattern. It became independent 15-20 yrs later than the vast majority of sub-Saharan African states (William Brown, 2002:140). If these statements arise from senior and seasoned figures on African politics then ignoring the significance of Zimbabwe in Africa might be food for thought for African policy makers. And already in 1977 a leading western expert on Zimbabwe, Robin Palmer noted that Rhodesia, as it was then called, forms part of the central economic system of southern Africa (Palmer, 1977: 246). More so the pre and post colonial leadership of the nation from the British South Africa Company (BSAC), Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe have been complex stories of strategic thinking, misery, measured dictatorships and half hearted visionaries depending with who their audiences were. These complexities have had capacities to invite strong direct and indirect interventions of what are usually termed

great powers in international relations politics. It is not the essence of this paper to challenge the definitional problem concept of “great powers” despite its controversialities. Based on the probable invitational consequences that the domestic policies of Zimbabwe have had to regional and international powers, it is then possible to contextualize the probable policy motives of those great powers and possible implications of their chosen policies. The EU as an undisputable great power in international politics is the case power to use as an example in discussing the dilemma of Zimbabwe. Milder humanitarian powers like Norway are suitable case powers in discussing this story as they might offer alternative approaches to those of greater powers. Zimbabwe’s policies have been many and its history has been long. As such I will focus on giving brief backgrounds on a few key issues which will make it possible to discuss the motives and probable implications of the EU and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe. These key issues are the backgrounds on Zimbabwe’s recent human rights history, her story of the struggle for land, the story of sanctions as well as a summarized history of her relations with the EU and Norway. Giving an explanatory picture on these issues is critical in seeing the position of Zimbabwe in relation to international actors as these issues have painfully shaped her nation building history.

Zimbabwe’s recent history- on Human Rights and Democracy

To say Zimbabwe’s history on human rights and democracy has been untroubled will be an unfortunate fantasy. And to say it has been historically unprogressive will sound unrealistic. Thus for instance as of 1997 in an evaluation report the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs wrote that “Unlike many other African countries explicit political conditionality has not been applied to Zimbabwe by the donor community. This can be explained simply by reference to a relatively good human rights record, at least in comparison with many other countries in the region. Gross and persistent human rights violations have been rare in Zimbabwe though there has been deterioration (Hilde Selbervik, 1997: 54-55). Such has been the ups and downs in the country’s struggle for democracy and human rights. Giving a human rights picture of

events in Zimbabwe limited to the period beginning in the year 2000 is malicious to attempts to genuinely understand the context of the democracy problem the country is facing. It has been unfortunate that the new and young populaces of both the western and Zimbabwean communities have been made to learn the democratic deficit in Zimbabwe this way. If this problem does not go away in the near future, then the future generations will be faced with a problem that they will find hard to solve due to probable limited contextualization that they might have. Invading and colonizing Zimbabwe in 1890, based on the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 ushered in a period of heightened colonial activity on the part of the European powers, while simultaneously eliminating most existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance. From this day the story of Zimbabwe had to go through the greatest life changes of almost all times. The story of colonization is the root to the democratic and human rights deficit in Zimbabwe today. For instance in a book on “democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe”, BJ Phiri and others analyses this issue at length. In the book Terence Ranger and Sabelo J. Ndlovu Gatsheni noted that missionaries and colonial officials worked to propagate the idea that much of the pre-colonial societies were undemocratic, whilst Welshman Ncube pointed out that in colonial Zimbabwe citizens could not always rely on colonial courts because evidence shows that that were times that the legal fraternity participated in the violation of human rights (BJ Phiri et al. 2003: 544). It was the colonial administration of the BSAC and Ian Smith which described the black African populaces as savage and uncivilized with Ian Smith declaring that these savages will not rule Zimbabwe in a thousand years, a phrase which Ian Smith has mostly been known for. Fortunately or unfortunately for Smith, the thousand years were swept aside by the power of the need for savage democracy and savage majority rule, which was democracy. And the thousand years become two decades. This was the typical story of human rights and democracy in colonial Zimbabwe where democracy meant apartheid and rule of the few by the few.

A remarkable date in the human rights history of Zimbabwe is the 18th of April in 1980. This is a date which closely defines democracy in the same way that the western nations do. It was a day in which free and fair elections, approved by what is called the

international community, were held and won by the majority. There was jubilation in African capitals as well as western capitals, including the capital of the former colonial power, the United Kingdom. This international jubilation was to continue in almost two decades to follow with the new leader of this nation, called Robert Mugabe being hailed as pragmatic and a visionary African hero. Little did this jubilation see the monumental problems ahead. To say Zimbabwe's 1980 leadership, whether black or white, was not heroic would be an understatement of reality. It was indeed heroic and it will remain so in the context of those times and especially on that particular date on the 18th of April. However the jubilation with this leadership planted the seeds of the human rights agony in today's Zimbabwe.

Having based their need to maintain order on the ills of the past, the post colonial leadership of Zimbabwe retained the instruments of the colonial administration to rule their newly born nation. Ian Smith's emergency orders remained in place, executive powers were strengthened and militarization of the state remained the order of the day. But the land issue was not addressed. Being on the brink of a civil war in the 1980s, the victorious leadership unleashed the newly added state space, machinery and military power to solve what was perceived as a danger to state sovereignty. In the process a significant number of national innocent civilians lost their lives. And these lives are part of the life rights, which are human rights. History did not record a significant international condemnation of these events. The post 2000 era was to repeat this mistake again. Moving from the 1980s decades into the 1990s era, the country's leadership practiced and signaled intentions to maintain a one party state and again there was no meaningful recorded complaints from the international community. It remained business as usual and gone was the 1990s decade. Came the year 2000 and the fire alarm rang internally and externally to the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. Why was it then and not before? The same 1980 administration is still the same 2000 administration in Zimbabwe. Why did I say colonialism is part of the root cause of the democratic deficit in this country? The fast changing human rights situation in Zimbabwe was exploited by the ruling administration as an attempt to correct colonial imbalances which they said were a threat to land and human rights of

the major majorities of the national populace. Thus the colonial card remained on the table and it still remains today, perhaps for political mileage. The African sub-continent and majorities of other governments from what is called the third world become confused and apparently warmed up to the possibility of the rhetoric of colonial imbalances. Maybe there is something to do with the perception of what democracy is to these third world nations. A leading Zimbabwean political scientist thus cautioned that in discussing democracy in Zimbabwe, it is important to note that there is no consensus yet as to the meaning of the term (Masipula Sithole 1988:217). In the western capitals the opposite was true. For the westerners there were no colonial related issues to do with the contemporary human rights realities in Zimbabwe. As such policies were adjusted in the western capitals to fit what they termed the changing human rights situation in Zimbabwe. It is these adjusted human rights policies towards Zimbabwe that we need to talk of in terms of motives and probable implications towards democracy in this country. Whilst the Zimbabwe administration was using the land reform card, the western capitals were using the sanctions card as part of the democratic restoration approaches. So it merits giving a background to these two issues as they seem central to the relational exchanges between the two sides.

A Human Rights history of the Land issue in Zimbabwe.

If there is one thing that defines Zimbabwe more than even its people, then the thing is the struggle for land. Even before colonialism local chieftaincies had skirmishes for land. When the Ndebele tribe came from South Africa's KwaZulu Natal and resettled in Zimbabwe, they had skirmishes for land control which died down gradually as they decided to go along. After all, crossing borders was a normal thing for African chieftaincies during those years and after all they thought they were all Bantu people, meaning one family scattered across the region. Then came the inter-continental colonial era which saw the British occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890. Occupation in this case means occupying the land which defines the Zimbabweans. In the Shona traditions, it is believed that the spirits of their ancestors, called the spirit mediums (like spirit mediums Mkwati, Nehanda and Kaguvi) live in the land. When rains fail

they go into the land and into the mountains to ask these spirit mediums for rains and for guidance on issues of life and survival. The independence wars in Zimbabwe are believed to have been spiritually led by the Shona and Ndebele spirit mediums and it is believed these mediums that live and own all the land on behalf of the people were successful in bringing about independence. Such is how land is valued in the history and contemporary life of the Zimbabweans. Then to lose the land during the colonial period had far reaching ramifications to the human rights dimensions unfolding in this country today as well to the international relations of the nation. It is common knowledge that colonial and post colonial governments in Zimbabwe have exploited the land issue as pretext to perpetuate gross human rights abuses against their citizens. This has been true of the 1965 to 1979 government and all the governments afterwards. It merits therefore to give a brief picture of how human related land rights were and are like in pre- and post independence Zimbabwe. This helps in understanding how politicians exploit this issue as if it's not a possible though unfortunate occurrence in human history.

In his 1990 publication on land reform in Zimbabwe, an expert on Zimbabwe, Robin Palmer gave an insight into the centrality of land issues in the politics of the country. Palmer noted that “on 18 April 1990 the famous Lancaster House Constitution expires and the Zimbabwean government will then at last be able to tackle the contentious and highly politicized land question unhindered by the constraints imposed by Britain in 1979/80. But there is every sign that the British government is striving behind the scenes to perpetuate Lancaster House beyond April 1990 and so prevent significant land reform from taking place in Zimbabwe (Palmer, 1990:163-64). If this was true then events in the recent past have proved how land can always shape the bad and the good in Zimbabwe. Already in his 1977 publication before independence Palmer had predicted the centrality of land politics in Zimbabwe noting that “the most acute and difficult question confronting the first government of Zimbabwe, whatever its ideological hue, will be that of land, bedeviled by its past use as a political and economic weapon by the whites, and by the consequent mythologies to which this has given rise (Palmer, 1977: 246). Palmer might have been right in pointing the

mythological issues associated with land in Zimbabwe. It might be the case in today's Zimbabwe that even in cases where human rights abuses which have nothing to do with land take place, the current rulers attempt to turn into the politics of land as a rescue mechanism. Palmer might have been right too in noting how the colonial administration used land as a political and economic weapon towards the indigenous African population. A lengthy quote from a publication by a local and academically respected Zimbabwean educationist, Sam Moyo helps give a picture of how land issues are viewed in that country. Moyo says "the dominant fear that state led land reform will bring economic collapse is unfounded, given the social and political implications of a failure to address the land question. Over six million indigenous black people live in Zimbabwe's marginal rural lands, the communal areas. These areas have poor soils and unreliable rainfall, producers lack control of water rights and are duly excluded from the bulk of the nation's natural resources. The unequal distribution of resources means that 4500 mainly white large scale farmers dominate Zimbabwe's agrarian economy. Together with transnational capital, white agrarian interests control key sectors such as tourism, forestry, commodity, exports and narrow agro-industrial sector underlying the urban political economy. These imbalances dramatically skew income distribution in Zimbabwe, reflecting an unchanged legacy of colonial rule. In spite of the liberation war, a narrow racial and class monopoly over land has been consolidated through extra market processes for decades". (Sam Moyo: 2000:5-6). The propositions I am highlighting here are propositions written by both African and European historians and academicians on land politics in Zimbabwe. These facts have meaning in understanding how land can easily be used by dictatorships and non dictators alike in the management of human rights regimes.

On a similar note as Sam Moyo quoted elsewhere, Arthur Hazlewood noted what needs to be recalled in discussing the land issue in Zimbabwe. Hazelwood notes that "It needs to be recalled that by virtue of the Land Tenure act of 1969 almost half of the country's (Zimbabwe's) agricultural land was allocated to Europeans, who had greater access to the regions considered suited to intensive crop and livestock production, and on average, each of the nearly 7000 European farms were roughly

100 times the size of any of the 700 000 or so holdings in the Tribal Trust Lands (land allocated to black Africans) (Arthur Hazlewood: 1985: 457) . Similarly, in a 1993 publication Gino Naldi noted that “with some seven million blacks living on 16 million hectares of poor communal lands, the 12 million hectares owned by some 4500 white large scale farmers constitute one third of the country’s arable land”. (Gino Naldi: 1993:585). This a short and summarized picture of how land shaped the human right regime in colonial Zimbabwe. Rights were based on apartheid systems and it might therefore be unsurprising that the international community reacted by launching an attack on the colonial system in colonial Zimbabwe. Most members of the EU and Norway, who are part of the subject of study in this paper were active in condemning this skewed set up in colonial Zimbabwe. They enacted sanctions against the minority rulers of those years and helped bring about a negotiated settlement which ushered in the special 18th April independence day in Zimbabwe. What had to unfold more than two decades from this day was again a story of land and again with consequences to the human rights and international relations of the country.

Having lost a constitutional referendum in the year 2000, the then Zimbabwean government unleashed a wave of its supporters to occupy vast lands occupied by large scale white commercial farmers. This was dubbed “the Third Chimurenga” (the third struggle”) and was portrayed as an attempt to regain land lost during the colonization process. It has been reported that scores of white commercial farmers were killed and some lost properties built on those farms they were occupying for decades. The exact number of how many white farmers were killed might be known in years to come. In the events of the same era, many black people lost their lives too. But some lost their lives far away from where the lands were being repossessed. For these people it is not clear if they had anything to do with the land reform agenda. Maybe again they were victims of land being used a tool for political enhancements. That’s why the issue of land in Zimbabwe has and will always shape the human rights agenda. Any attempts to call for the correction of wayward human rights policies by the rulers of Zimbabwe might be interpreted by these rulers as neocolonial threats to local land ownership. As events have showed in the past, this strategy has proved a perfect sale to the

constituencies of the third world. Why then not face this issue, just face it, deal with it and what will be left in future as an excuse to subvert human rights of generations. The western capitals, and influentially the EU, in which the UK is a member has tried what it called targeted sanctions as part of the strategies to respond to what it called human rights abuses in today's Zimbabwe. Norway too has responded to what it viewed as human rights abuses in this country. It might therefore help to give a brief picture of the historical relations between the European Union and Zimbabwe as well as between Norway and Zimbabwe. Thereafter the paper will proceed to analyze the possible motives of the current human rights policies of these two blocks towards Zimbabwe as well their probable implications.

EU Zimbabwe relations - a history

Relations between the EU and Zimbabwe are not new. But these relations are volatile and dynamic. The relations are and were characterized by periods of struggles for ideals and sometimes for international survival. Cooperation between the European Union and Zimbabwe has been of significant influence to Zimbabwe's internal economic, social and political dynamics. The links between these two blocks extends a long way back to the time when the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. The rights and obligations flowing from the Lome Convention and its successors have dominated Zimbabwe's partnership with the EU (EU Commission 19997:2). The EU human rights position on Zimbabwe has been more emphatical throughout their relations though the extents of the emphasis may have graduated to different levels in various periods. The Lome convention has formed a wider framework of relations between the EU and the nations of the African, Caribbean and the Pacific islands (ACP). The accession of Zimbabwe to Lome was greatly influenced by the EU's desire for the newly independent country to solidify its relations with western states, and the accession formed a part of the process of defining the country's entry into the international system. (William Brown: 2002: 139). Much of the acrimonial relations between the two nations have been played in and outside of the confines of the Lome Agreement. Possibilities for shifting the course of their relations

have also been viewed within this Agreement and now within the successor agreement, which is the Cotonou Agreement.

Just like Norway, the EU has been offering aid to Zimbabwe for a long time. In fact the EU is the biggest donor to the country whilst Norway was the 8th largest donor nation to Zimbabwe before 2000. The linkage between human rights and aid has been a very strong policy of the EU in relation to Zimbabwe. The implications of this policy to the democratization agenda in the country have been significant though the negativity or positivity degrees of these policies have been a question of wider debates. The relations between the EU and Zimbabwe have widely and directly affected the EU-Africa relations too. Perez noted that the difficult relationship with Zimbabwe has had wider implications for the EU's relations with the African Union (AU) and sub regional organizations (M.G.Perez 2007: 114). Holding summits between the EU and Africa have been problematised by the tensions between the EU and Zimbabwe. The analysis of the Zimbabwe-EU human rights relations also need to done with the framework of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African countries. After the political crisis that started in Zimbabwe from the year 2000, the relations between the EU and Zimbabwe have deteriorated significantly. The pursuant deterioration in the relations allegedly on the grounds of human rights violations in Zimbabwe have seen a sharper and hostile EU approach to the country and the Zimbabwean government has also responded in a hostile way to the calls for improving the human rights violations in the country. The implications of the EU human rights approach to the democratization process in Zimbabwe is thus a critical undertaking to make, both for the sake of future EU policy making and for addressing the human rights challenges in Zimbabwe.

Norwegian Zimbabwe Relations - a history

Norwegian-Zimbabwe relations date back to the pre-independence era when Norway was part of an active international community of nations that campaigned against the colonial administration in Zimbabwe. Norway continued its state to state relations

from Zimbabwe's attainment of independence in 1980 especially in form of development aid. (Selbervik:1997:57). Historical relations between the two nations since 1980 have been shaped by the aid policy of Norway and the human rights subject was minimal in the first two decades of their relations. Human rights questions or the political situation in general has not been prominent in Norwegian-Zimbabwe aid relations before 2000. No explicit political conditionality has ever been imposed by the Norwegian government, at least before 1997. However in next meetings between Norway and Zimbabwe, Norway was expected to put more emphasis on human rights issues. (Selbervik, UD Evaluation Report: 1997:p57). Nevertheless since the year 2000 the Norwegian government has increased its emphasis on human rights issues in its dealings with Zimbabwe. Thus promotion of human rights and democracy has become an increasingly important objective in the foreign policy of Norway (Selbervik: 1997: iv). As far back as 1997 the then Norwegian minister of development co-operation, Kari Nordheim-Larsen noted that "by means of development aid, we should endeavor to support measures, institutions and reform processes that promote democracy and human rights. (Development Today no.2, 1997). She acknowledged, however, that Norway often faces many dilemmas in the implementation of this policy (UD Evaluation Report: 1997: 52). It can be noted that the Norwegian foreign and aid policy to Zimbabwe had little emphasis on human rights issues at least up to around 1999. The beginning of the 21st century saw this policy shifting significantly owing to the worsening human rights conditions in Zimbabwe as opposed to the pre-1997 era when Hilde Selbervik pointed out that Zimbabwe had a relatively good human rights record, at least in comparison with many other countries in the region and that gross and persistent human rights violations have been rare in Zimbabwe though there has been a deterioration since 1997. (Selbervik: 1997: 54-55). As noted this situation has changed as has been the Norwegian human rights policy on Zimbabwe today. The implications of the contemporary Norwegian human rights approach to Zimbabwe's democratization process is thus important in understanding and mapping future Norwegian-Zimbabwe relations especially in the promotion of democracy and human rights. The variances between the strong EU emphases on a tougher approach vis-à-vis

a moderated Norwegian human rights approach to dealings with Zimbabwe will be part of the deliberations to be made in the ensuing sections of this publication.

Summary

This chapter noted the inequalities that have been persistent with regards to land and human rights in Zimbabwe. Colonial administrators used the land as a weapon to control the majority of the population and thereby suppressing their human rights. The post colonial governments in Zimbabwe have also exploited the land issue as a tool to maintain power and to defend themselves. It has also been noted that relations between the EU and Zimbabwe have been troubled in the recent past. Similarly Norwegian-Zimbabwe relations have of late been unstable. The land and human rights issues have continued to interfere in the relations between the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe. Thus this background was vital in understanding the political dynamics of the foreign relations, human rights and economic issues in contemporary Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 3

The European Union and Zimbabwe: A Realistic Approach?

A number of policy instruments have been deployed by the EU block to manifest its human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. An endeavor to analyze the motives of the EU in implementing such human rights instruments on Zimbabwe is what this section intends to dwell on. There are many ways which the EU politically relates to Zimbabwe. This analysis will focus on some of the major EU policies on Zimbabwe. The selected policies for discussion are the sanctions policy, the civil society support policy, trade/economic relations and internal policy divergences within the EU on Zimbabwe and aspects on general foreign policy. To what extent do these policies explain the motives of the European Union towards Zimbabwe? Are the policies designed to entrench the European dominance and hegemony over Zimbabwe or are they tailored towards genuine promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe? The essence of this discussion is to dig a deeper hole in search of wanting to understand such questions. Discussions on the workability of sanctions as a policy have been going on for ages though an open discussion about the real motives behind such a tool have been slippery. Hereunder EU's sanctions policy and possible motives on Zimbabwe will be deliberated upon.

The Sanctions Instrument

One of the most lethal weapons that humans have used to dominate or eliminate each other in human history has been the employment of sanctions in many forms. Some empires, kingdoms, monarchs, states and republics chose naval blockades, some chose food sanctions and some chose scorched earth policies to force their policy preferences over their enemy targets. In our discussion the EU chose what it defined as targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. This method of targeted sanctions encompasses a mixture of military/arms embargo, travel restrictions and assets freeze. The discussion of sanctions against Zimbabwe as an EU policy has in most cases raised boiling temperatures as there are wide varieties of arguments on who exactly the sanctions are

targeted at. Are they targeted at Zimbabwe or at Zimbabwe`s leadership? This debate raises the question of the assumption versus reality of the sanctions. The following diagrammatic representation shows the EU definition of the sanction`s target and the other diagram shows the reality of the sanction`s target. This presentation assists in deliberating on the arguments of whether the sanctions tool is being employed as weapon to advance the EU`s interests on Zimbabwe or whether it is directed at promoting human rights in Zimbabwe.




Diagram 3a above: This presentation (above) shows how the EU sees the sanctions from its own eye. It sees them as being targeted at specific individuals who undermine human rights in Zimbabwe.



Diagram 3b above : This diagram shows the reality of the effects of the EU sanctions on the life of Zimbabwe as a nation as well as against its leaders.

Form the above mentioned diagrammatic presentations it can be noted that there are two significantly different views on what kind of sanctions the European Union has placed on Zimbabwe. One view is that of the EU which claims that its sanctions are targeted sanctions- “measures that target specific people, resources, or services and that will reduce harmful humanitarian effects” (Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 2007: 739). Targeted sanctions is a policy measure that came into being after policy makers realised the limits of comprehensive sanctions which did not spare innocent civilian populations. If the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe are really intended to force genuine political reform in Zimbabwe then there should be actions from the EU which proves it. The two major political parties in Zimbabwe, namely the MDC and the ZANU-PF, entered into a political agreement which they call the Global Political Agreement (GPA). In an interview with Doctor Sabelo Ndlovu who is a historian and lecturer on Zimbabwean and African politics, he pointed out that the EU imposed restrictive measures (sanctions) on Zimbabwe as a way of forcing ZANU-PF to negotiate with the MDC for a political settlement to the crisis in the country. Dr Ndlovu went on to

note that since the MDC and ZANU-PF have signed a political agreement (GPA), then the EU should lift the restrictions/sanctions (Interview with Dr Sabelo). This position sounds pragmatic. At first the European Union claimed that they wanted the parties to negotiate a settlement before the EU can lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe. After the parties reached a signed agreement and formed a new government, the EU is still refusing to lift the sanctions. What then is the motive behind such behaviour?

A possible description of the EU's position on sanctions against Zimbabwe can be that the EU block is pushing its own interests rather than the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. This can be depicted by the second diagram (3b) in the drawing above which shows that the real sanctions against Zimbabwe go beyond targeted sanctions. The sanctions have led to economic stagnation in the country. The economic and political consequence of the sanctions have led to the demise of the health, education, social services and the employment sectors, just to mention a few. The reality is that the country has not managed to borrow from the IMF and the World Bank as well as major international financial institutions. The debilitating effects of the sanctions have had no meaningful impact on the ruling elites in Zimbabwe. Infact it has been the general populace which has been suffering in this country. It has been widely reported that unemployment in Zimbabwe between the period 2003 to 2010 neared between 70 to 94 percent. This is one of the worst recorded unemployment figures in the history of nations. Despite the impact of these sanctions the EU has continued to use diplomatic language like "targeted sanctions" when the reality shows that these sanctions are both targeted and comprehensive against the general people. Chantal de Jonge made a meaningful observation in relation to sanctions. She noted that "underlying the theory of sanctions is the expectation that economic costs will translate into political effects – that economic deprivation will produce public anger and politically significant protest. It is expected that this, in turn, will lead to changes in the behaviour of troublemaking elites or to their removal from power" (Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 2007: 743). By so doing the imposer of sanctions will achieve his/her self interests. From this view point the EU can be said to be pushing for its own interests rather than the interests of real development in Zimbabwe. The EU block has an interest of seeing a government

which they believe can make it possible for the EU to extract its interests in Zimbabwe. There are possible alternatives that the EU could employ in order to target political authoritarians in Zimbabwe. Instead of economic sanctions imposed under the name of “targeted sanctions”, the EU should make their case in the United Nations Security Council. If the UN Security Council imposes sanctions against Zimbabwe then their legitimacy will be difficult to argue against. Thus if EU member states want to genuinely help Zimbabwe to develop a strong and sound human rights and economic situation, then the United Nations should be respected as a body that has the mandate to impose such sanctions. Furthermore the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be a useful instrument in targeting violators of human rights in Zimbabwe instead of sanctions. A reformed, balanced, credible and apolitical ICC can be given evidence of the human rights abuses and then issue arrest warrants against the human rights violators. The same basis that the ICC might use to prosecute human rights violators in Zimbabwe should be swiftly used to prosecute human rights violators in any country of the world without exception. This might prove more genuine in efforts to avert the ongoing human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The EU’s self interest position on Zimbabwe does not translate to mean the absence of the need for reforms in the country’s human rights policy.

Beyond any reasonable doubt there have been persistent state supported human rights violations in Zimbabwe since her recent recorded history from the 1890s to the current era. It is also strongly evident that the period from the year 2000 to the present has witnessed one of the most politically charged human rights violations in the post colonial history of the nation. The fact that the country has experienced human rights abuses from colonial administrators can not be a justification for continued human rights abuses today. Most nations of the world have gone through rights abuses of unimaginable proportions but such histories have not stopped the civilisation of nations into peaceful and progressive nations. Examples from Europe can best explain such scenarios. Despite the agonies of the first and second world wars, Europe has put the histories behind them and have learnt from such histories that human rights respect is one of the most cheritable gifts to mankind. As such it would be admirable if the

EU's human rights policy towards Zimbabwe was tailored towards imposing such progressive values of the respect for human rights and democracy. Unfortunately the current policies of the EU have not offered sufficient proof that it has the genuine intention to help the general people in Zimbabwe out of the woods.

More so if the EU sees the government in Zimbabwe as undemocratic, then it comes back to the arguments of the differences between the defining the concept of democracy. Whereas the western developed nations see most governments from the developing world as undemocratic, it is hard to think that dictators see themselves as dictators. William Brown noted that defining 'democratic' government is a rather more contested idea, which is less widely accepted and is dismissed by some (normally authoritarian) southern regimes as a 'western' notion of government unsuitable to Asian, African or less usually, Latin American societies (William Brown, 2002: 121). This argument seems to be the same position advanced by the southern rulers in Zimbabwe. They exploit the incompetence of the EU's sanctions position and preach the gospel that the western governments want to impose their cultures on the country. This has probably made the ruling class in Zimbabwe to hold on to power with sympathy from African nations who are tempted to believe this argument. If the EU had taken the route of convincing the UN security council to impose the sanctions on Zimbabwe, then the argument that the EU is fighting to impose its self-will on Zimbabwe would be significantly weakened, though it will not be removed unless the representation system in the UN security council is altered to reflect the post world war II and post cold war set up in today's world. Thus the EU has a lot of work to do in order to convince the people of Zimbabwe that its intentions are not self interested rhetoricism.

Notes about a telephone interview on the EU and Zimbabwe with Dr Sabelo Ndlovu on 17 February 2010 whilst he was in South Africa. The discussion interview took about one hour.

Dr Ndlovu was a lecturer of African History and Development Studies at the Midlands State University in Zimbabwe and a lecturer at the Ferguson School of African and

Oriental Studies at Oxford University in the United Kingdom and he wrote a number of articles in Journals of African Studies. He has written a number of books on the History of Zimbabwe alongside Zimbabwean experts like Terrence Ranger. At the time of the interview he was planning to join the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Question: Dr Ndlovu I need your help in dissecting the EU's position on Zimbabwe in terms of sanctions and their motives. What are the sanctions designed to do by the EU?

DR Ndlovu: I would not like to call them sanctions. They are restrictive measures imposed by the European Union on Zimbabwe. It should be noted that the United Kingdom has its own measures against Zimbabwe which are different from the EU. Thus UK has two sanctions against Zimbabwe: as an EU member and their own bilateral restrictions on Zimbabwe. The main actors are the EU and the UK but Canada, USA and Australia also follow the main actors and sometimes act on their own. It is true that the main actors like the EU and UK have their own interests in Zimbabwe. UK and EU have different interests and that is why you see that the UK has its own measures. The United Kingdom for instance has said even if the EU lifts the restrictions, it will not follow suit until it feels that things have changed in Zimbabwe. Why did the EU or UK put restrictive measures on Zimbabwe? It is partly because they needed to pressure ZANU PF into negotiations since things were going badly in the country. Now that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) or coalition agreement has been signed the measures must be removed. Again the tricky part is that there seems to be no movement in the GPA and that's why the EU extended the measures from the beginning of 2010.

This is a brief extract from an interview I had with Doctor Sabelo Ndlovu. He preferred to employ the term "restrictive" supposedly because he is a senior connection in the ruling MDC political party. Dr Ndlovu's comments gives insights into the study of trying to understand the EU human rights policy and motives towards Zimbabwe. If, as he pointed out that the sanctions were meant to pressure the then ruling party into negotiations, can we therefore say that the restrictive measures, which I will call sanctions, makes the EU rational? In fact, it might rather mean that the EU

has a double agenda in imposing the sanctions. As noted and as will be discussed throughout the paper the EU wants to promote its own self interests as well as having a genuine desire to foster an environment in which human rights are respected in Zimbabwe. By actively participating in the design for a political coalition the EU thought that this would bring an environment through which it can genuinely help the people in the country to realize democracy. At the same time the EU thought that the coalition agreement will present an opportunity for gradual political transition in the country which will enable the long term self interests of the EU to be realized in the form of economic benefits as will be discussed on the section on the economic dynamics of the EU's human rights policy. What can also be noted from this discussion with Ndlovu is that the reality on the ground shows very limited signs in the implementation of the coalition agreement to date. This has presented challenges to the EU in terms of whether they should lift the sanction or not. If the sanctions are genuinely meant to force the political parties to promote human rights in Zimbabwe, then their objectives are far from being realized and as such it might take dear time before the sanctions are revised or lifted. If the sanctions are in realism terms meant as foreign policy tool to dominate and extract resources, then the sanctions have achieved in domination and failed on extraction; at least for now. On these premises it becomes difficult to see how these sanctions can be said to be successful in the foreseeable future.

The Economics of Human Rights- Who rules the trade, aid and the economy?

Why does the EU need Zimbabwe or does it need her at all? What shapes and governs trade and economic relations between the EU block and Zimbabwe? Responses to such questions assist in gaining hind sights into the probable motives of the EU human rights and foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. For most major European nations their connections with Africa are not new. Such connections are rooted in long histories of colonial governance and capitalism. Initial formalization of relations between the European community and the African nations as blocks were mired within the context of their colonial past and the European desire to help developing nations to develop

their economies. Treaties began as the norm to regularize and formalize these corporations. Here under the Treaty of Rome and later the Cotonou Agreement will be discussed as they are the benchmarks upon which the EU relates to Zimbabwe.

As McMahon.J.A (1998:1) noted, specific objectives are set for the EC's development cooperation policy in Article 130u of the Treaty of Rome introduced by the Treaty of the European Union. It stipulates that:

European Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:

- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy
- The campaign against poverty in the developing countries.
- European Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (McMahon Joseph A: 1998: 1).

The vision of the European Community (and/or EU) as stipulated in the quoted extracts from the Treaty of Rome was designed to assist in uplifting the economies of the developing world and especially African ones. Europe was committing itself to helping in sustainable social and economic development, integration of developing economies into the global economy, fighting poverty and most crucially to promote the rule of law and human rights. Further, article 1 of the first Lome Convention states that in the field of trade co-operation, the object of this Convention is to promote trade between the Contracting Parties, taking account of their respective levels of development, and in particular, of the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of ACP States, in order to accelerate the rate of growth of their trade and improve the conditions of access of their products to the markets of the European Economic

Community, so as to ensure a better balance in the trade of the Contracting Parties (McMahon Joseph A: 1998:45). It can be noted from both the Treaty of Rome and the Lome Convention that if the real motives of the EU have been to assist economies of poor nations, then the economies of the developing nations would have shot up significantly. Olufemi and Gerrit have stated that the overall welfare of the ACP countries has been disappointing- perhaps the most telling statistics is the share of ACP products in total EU imports (imports from the South), which has precipitously declined from roughly eight percent (20%) in 1975 to under 4% (9%) by the late 1990s. (Babarinde Olufemi and Faber Gerrit: 2005:26). In general it can be noted that developing nations have not gained much from the economic corporation between them and the EU. The story of Zimbabwe turned from hope to grim. In the last decades owing to a conglomeration of causes ranging from economic mismanagement by the sitting government and lack of rule of law, to sanctions and international isolation of the nation, the country has been brought down to its knees.

It is of paramount significance to note that the economics of a nation is crucial to its survival, coupled with correct management manifested through governance and human rights regimes. To such an end the economy of Zimbabwe has been found wanting. It is problematic to think that the general people of Zimbabwe own their economy. The sad reality is that the new rulers of the nation have adopted their predecessor's culture of economic aggrandizement at the expense of national development. Despite repeated arguments by the post independence government in Zimbabwe that the EU is the architecture of the country's economic woes, the facts on the ground shows that the government itself shares a significant responsibility for the economic decline in the country. External factors alone cannot explain the decay of nation's economy. Economies which survive in liberal and democratic environments do not free fall as the case with what transpired in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean economy is estimated to have shrunk by more than 40-50% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) within 10 years from the year 2000. However the external economic power of the EU cannot be ignored in relation to the economic development of Zimbabwe. It can be argued that the EU has strong economic motives that rival the motive to promote human rights

values in Zimbabwe. The European block sees Zimbabwe as a potential economic haven as Africa becomes the last frontier in the fight for resources. Van Mirjam therefore rightly noted that the relations between the EU and the developing world are rooted in three major historical circumstances: Europe's colonial past, the politics of the Cold War, and the creation and expansion of the EU(Van Reisen Mirjam:2007:59) She further notes that the EU needs the South, it needs energy, raw materials, primary products, and minerals; the EU needs the labor forces of the South, the export markets they provide, and as locations for foreign direct investment..(Van Reisen Mirjam: 2007:59). The tables below help to explain the economic control that the EU has on Zimbabwe which makes it a possibility that the economic protection of its interests in Zimbabwe cannot be ignored. The tables have been made with data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. I extracted data related to European investments in Zimbabwe over time in an endeavor to solicit an understanding of the significance of the EU's potential economic motives in Zimbabwe.

Largest Affiliates of Foreign based Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Zimbabwe-
Table 3a

COMPANY	HOST ECONOMY	INDUSTRY
CSC Meat importers	UK	Food & kindred products
Africa Plantations ltd	USA	Agriculture
Bicc Cafca	Netherlands	Metals
Tobacco Processors Zim	UK	Tobacco
ZSR Ltd	UK	Trade/sugar
Constain Africa	UK	Construction
Ashanti Goldfields Zim	UK	Trade/Minerals
Zim United Transport	UK	Finance
Merchant Bank C Africa	Switzerland	Finance
Delta Gold Zimbabwe	Australia	Finance

Source: data extracted from United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, FDI Brief on Zimbabwe 1992-2002.

As can be noted from the table above (table 3a) most of the largest foreign owned companies in Zimbabwe are owned by industries from the EU, especially the UK. This also partly explains the dynamics within the EU whereby they sometimes compete for resources in their foreign policy undertakings and in the process human rights is made a victim. The mentioned companies in this table like Zimbabwe Sugar Refineries (ZSR), Tobacco Processors Zimbabwe, Constain and the Cold Storage Company are some of the major entities that control real production of resources in Zimbabwe. It is unimaginable to think that the EU will ignore a situation whereby a government in Zimbabwe takes over lands that feeds these large companies. The realism theorists argue therefore that such international politicking is a fight for domination of other nations in order to promote self interests of the stronger states.

Most foreign investments in Zimbabwe originate from the western nations especially the EU which is the largest trading partner as well as donor for Zimbabwe. Tables below are designed to give a brief picture of how much influence the EU has through Foreign Direct Investments in Zimbabwe as well as giving a picture of the economic situation in Zimbabwe which can be linked to the human rights disrespect in the country. The data in the tables is made with figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2003.

Zimbabwe Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Stocks- (in millions of US dollars)

FDI Flows-Zimbabwe- millions of US\$.

Kolonne1	1985-1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Inward flows	14	444	59	23	4	26
Outward flows	12	9	9	8	4	3

Table 3b

Source :Table made with Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics

FDI Flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation of Zimbabwe.

Kolonne1	1985-1995	1999	2000	2001	2002
Inward flows	0,8	7,,2	2,6	0,5	7,5
Outward flows	0,9	1,1	0,8	0,6	0,9

Table 3c

Source :Table made with Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics

FDI Stocks-Zimbabwe- millions of US\$.

Kolonne1	1980	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Inward stocks	186	124	342	1085	1088	1 114
Outward stocks		88	137	241	245	249

Table 3d

Source :Table made with Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics

FDI Stocks as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Zimbabwe.

Kolonne1	1980	1990	2000	2001	2002
Inward stocks	2..8	1,4	15,5	11,8	5..8
Outwards stocks		1	3,4	2,7	1,3

Table 3e

Source :Table made with Figures from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, unctad.org/fdistatistics

Data from these tables help to understand that Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into Zimbabwe have a potential be utilized as a measure of economic control on Zimbabwe which the EU has arguably attempted to do. As can be noted from tables 3c and 3e Inward flows and stocks of FDI into Zimbabwe have always been higher as percentage terms of fixed capital formation and GDP. Inward flows show how much money in US dollars has been invested in Zimbabwe. Inward stocks show how much value do foreign owned assets settled in Zimbabwe as investments are worth. Outward flows and Outward stocks show much Zimbabwe has invested outside her borders. Noting that inward flows are higher than outwards flows, it means therefore that the EU has much power to lock and unlock the economy of Zimbabwe as it has done through parts of the sanctions imposed on the country. On a note on what the European Commission is doing to support governance, democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, the commission noted that the 10th European Development Fund agreed with Zimbabwe “will be implemented as soon as the restrictive policy (sanctions) towards Zimbabwe is lifted” (Delegation of the European Union in Zimbabwe website). This statement from the European delegation in Zimbabwe serves to show that the sanctions against Zimbabwe are imposed on Zimbabwe as a nation and not only against the ruling party individuals in the country. The term “restrictive” come into force after the EU realized that use of the term “sanctions” would impede the signing of the current coalition agreement in Zimbabwe and after the EU realized that the term “sanctions” can easily be manipulated to campaign against it by the long time presidency in the country which favors no democracy at the present moment.

The data from the tables also further helps to explain the controlling motives of the EU to the economy of Zimbabwe. Noting that the undemocratic government in Zimbabwe was threatening their investments, the restrictive (sanctions) measures of the EU meant that large TNCs from Europe could not make much profit in Zimbabwe. At the same time the EU can simply instruct their companies to withdraw investment from Zimbabwe and thereby suffocating the economy and small industries which dependent

on the bigger companies. Other companies on the tables (table 3a about large TNCs in Zimbabwe) like Delta Gold Zimbabwe are Australian owned. Australia is a country which easily follows the lead of the EU in its policy on Zimbabwe and as can be remembered the Australian monarch is the Queen of England, which makes Australia to have closer connections with Europe in addition to the historical circumstances. It can thus be argued that in realist terms the European Union has both economic and political self interest in its human rights politicking on Zimbabwe. It is not the assertion of this research work that the policies are always negative. Rather the EU's political economy of human rights on Zimbabwe reveals the economic motives of the block in its foreign policy engagements with Zimbabwe.

Civil Society Corporation Technique: “EUs hand of God?”

That the socio-political and economic world is changing, is an element that the global citizens having been finding hard to deny. A critical part of this change in equation has been the rising influence of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). A meaningful and practical reality is that the relations between the European Union and Zimbabwe have been agonizingly strained by the issue NGOs. More so it is a fact that both sides have attempted to use the NGO politick for their policy advancement. Is the EU utilizing the NGOs as the undercover for the advancement of its self interests or is the EU-NGO Corporation simply for the rational promotion of EU values on governance or for real human rights purposes? In other words is the EU employing NGOs as tools to achieve its motives? Debates on such issues have been nut cracking and inconclusive.

Vehement propositions argue for different positions in response to the question of the efficacy of civil society organizations in development. In the case of Zimbabwe, her government has always argued pessimistically against NGOs. Zimbabwe's current rulers (meaning the President's supporters who have actual power in the coalition administration) have argued that the EU has been and is still using the NGOs as a tool for promoting their self economic and political agendas. Is this a fair assessment by the government of Zimbabwe regarding the EU's policy towards Zimbabwe via NGOs?

As noted this issue is always an inconclusive debate. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that a plethora of evidence from the local and international organizations have proved that the current situation in Zimbabwe is fraught with deep human rights violations. It is hard to deny that the European origin NGOs have arguably been of tremendous significance in helping a sizeable majority of rural Zimbabweans to beat the serious threats to their survival brought about by the latest and reoccurring episodes of hunger, drought and multi faceted economic decline of the nation. These NGOs have largely been raising finances from the European publics and governments to finance their development operations in Zimbabwe. The tricky part in the life of some of the NGOs who operate in Zimbabwe has been that they receive some of their donations from their home governments. The unfortunate consequence of such a policy has been that when such organizations are from perceived hostile EU member governments, they have been labeled western tools of destabilization. EU based NGOs from nations like Great Britain have especially been the focus of suspicion by the government in Zimbabwe. Differences in the role of what NGOs should play in Zimbabwean and African development in general have been sources of tensions between the EU and Zimbabwe and thereby driving the suspicion from Zimbabwe that the EU based NGOs are not a source for good.

During the ministerial negotiations held in Brussels in July 1999, all parties acknowledged the importance of associating non-state actors in order to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the ACP Group (Carbone Maurizio: 2005:184) . However, the EU argued for consulting and informing non-state actors in political dialogue, dialogue on corporation strategies, and implementing the cooperation agreement; the ACP Group, while accepting that non-governmental actors should be associated, stressed once again the primary role of national authorities in development, and even questioned governance, accountability and transparency of CSOs (Carbone Maurizio: 2005:184). From such a standpoint it can be noted that the view of developing nations towards NGOs differs significantly from the European position. The case of Zimbabwe`s stance towards NGOs is a classical example that can be applied to lessons on most developing nations. It can be noted from the above

statement that the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations are said to even question the accountability and transparency of NGOs. The near reality is that indeed a member nation of the ACP like Zimbabwe accepts NGOs in its society not out of will but as a no option scenario. A Zimbabwean government of today can only whole heartedly accept NGOs if such entities agree to be blind to human rights abuses and ignore the language of democracy. It can be as such due the fact that the current administration in the country does not adore democracy. In my conversation with Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, he was clear that the situation in Zimbabwe was terrible. I met Mr. Annan in February 2009 at an annual strategic meeting for the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights in Norway where I was doing my internship. In my five minute discussion with him, Mr. Annan was clear in our conversation that he sees no real interest in the government of Zimbabwe to reform for the better of human rights. Mr. Annan however noted to me that it is the role of NGOs to attempt to influence the systems by speaking out against abuses in objective ways. I had a similar discussion with the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Laurite, Professor Wangari Maathai of Kenya during a World Environmental Day ceremony in June 2007 in Tromsø, Norway. Professor Maathai expressed to me the importance of civil society activism in development issues and in particular to human rights challenges in Zimbabwe. Based on such sharing from human rights campaigners and policy makers it can be argued that well intentioned NGOs can be a force for progressive change. Nevertheless despite being a notable potential forces for development NGOs have been accused of pushing the EU's agenda for political and self interests by dictators who sees them as obstacles. But can it be totally said that the NGOs are pure angels for development in Zimbabwe? Can it be said that the NGOs have not been manipulated to pursue interests of the EU?

Not all NGOs from the EU operating in Zimbabwe have been found to be politically and economically independent from the EU foreign policy. The conduct of some of the NGOs has been shroud with inconsistencies and this has in the end landed them into criticisms that are problematic to defend. As noted earlier the history of land in Zimbabwe is what defines much of what this nation will suffer or prosper. The death

or survival of an agro-mining economy like Zimbabwe depends mostly on land ownership. As such the catastrophic shouts and sustained campaigns by many NGOs against the government of Zimbabwe during a time when this administration used the politics of land reform from the year 2000 onwards was self defeating for the purposes that the NGOs wanted to achieve. For the NGOs it was a campaign designed to end or stop perpetration of violence and potential mass murder. Their intentions can hardly be said to have been misguided. Indeed it sounds like the NGOs had good intentions. Most of them campaigned vigorously for the imposition of (targeted) sanctions against Zimbabwe. They campaigned for European governments and like minded nations to impose the sanctions. In the end the reality on the ground in Zimbabwe is that the isolation of Zimbabwe brought about, in part, by the collaboration between the EU and its NGOs to sanction the country has deprived her populace of life, dignity and friendships. More so the fact that the NGOs were silent during many eras of violence and deprivation in the larger part of the history of Zimbabwe weakens their current argument and consequently that of the EU as benefactors of this nation. Current voices from the EU and the NGOs support compensation to those who supposedly lost lands from the year 2000 onwards and make it the main hidden pre-condition for unscrewing the sanctions pipe. Indeed in a world of property rights and investment incentives there should be impartial regimes of fair compensations for lost properties. However what weakens the argument of the EU and the EU based human rights organizations is that no one has reminded them that the history of Zimbabwe does not start in the year 2000. The totality of her history from 1890 is what needs to be understood and then a holistic approach to tackling the land and human rights issues in Zimbabwe can be found. If the EU partners its NGOs in ignoring the fact that the scars of Zimbabwe are a result of more than a century of apartheid policies which had no land rights for certain groups at all, then the long term solution to the human rights in Zimbabwe will remain elusive. The historical injustices have a high chance of being manipulated by current and future politicians to sustain political power and subdue democracy when it goes against their interests. Even a government which the EU and the EU based NGOs wishes to see in Zimbabwe today provides no absolute guarantees

that they will not use the meandered historicity of land and justice when the political need arises in future. In the end it will be highly likely that it is democracy and human rights that will lose. It should be remembered that democracy and human rights are not living creatures but are rather rights of the people to freedom from violence, want and deprivation. Thus if the EU and NGOs, powerful as they are, continue with deliberate ignorance to the need for historical, holistic and contemporary justice in Zimbabwe, then even their pursuit of rational or self interested motives for universal human rights realization will remain in and out of the intensive care unit in Zimbabwe. The EU's strategic partnership with NGOs towards democratization in Zimbabwe is a noble idea that lacks the willingness to understand what should be understood in order to help with a solution to the crisis. The hard truth is that Zimbabwe cannot do without the European Union and the NGOs. She needs them in as much as Europe needs Zimbabwe to promote her values on human rights, dignity and democracy.

Zimbabwe –A platform to impose the rational values of the EU?

The question of values is central to all cultures. In as much as different cultures argue in support of their traditional and cultural values, there is no justification in arguing for a culture that supports violence and terror. Zimbabwe is not such a culture and neither is the EU. However the recent developments in the political life of Zimbabwe is a disturbing scenario which calls for urgent and well intentioned democratic cultures to intervene in breaking the possibility of a potential culture of intolerance and violence. This is where the EU's push for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe is put to the test. Again this is a case where the European Union can prove its credentials by genuinely helping to rebuild Zimbabwe through supporting the culture of tolerance and universal respect of human rights and restorative justice. In her article entitled “The enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What future”, Van Mirjam accurately noted that the EU also needs the South to promote the values on which it was founded- the European values of social democracy, the promotion of human rights, and accountable and transparent governance (Van Reisen Mirjam: 2007:59). Promoting democratic values in a transparent manner necessitates one to be a credible

international player. By so doing the EU can expand its horizon in influencing international cultures and Zimbabwe's culture in particular to be reformative in the human rights arena. Van Reisen Mirjam went further noting that the EU needs the South if it wants to fulfill its aspirations of becoming a global player- If the EU rejects the notion of a unipolar world that is dictated to by the United States it will need to seek alliances with the South (Van Reisen Mirjam: 2007:59). As a very influential nation in African liberation theology and contemporary African politics, Zimbabwe is a nation that a serious EU African policy planner will ignore at their future peril. This is not overvaluing the significance of Zimbabwe but rather this position is in line with events which have shown the significance of Zimbabwe to the whole of Africa. A plethora of national and international NGOs have noted in several communiqués that the situation in Zimbabwe has the greatest potential to lead or destroy the way for African democracy. As such the EU has the challenge of making her intentions clear by promoting a culture of genuine democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe without compromising her possibilities by fronting realism based self interests designed for domination akin to the 19th century politics.

An interview discussion I had with Marianne Riddervold a Doctoral Candidate at the Norwegian Center for European Research (ARENA) might also help in gaining an understanding on general European Union Foreign Policy. The discussion with Marianne was held on 22 December 2009 at the ARENA offices at Ullevål in Oslo for about 3 hours from 1500hrs to 1800hrs Norwegian time. Before the interview we had communicated by email and I managed to set up this appointment. This is what she had to say and I paraphrase the discussion: the traditional understanding is that the EU foreign policy is based on realistic assumptions of material interests. To some extent it might be true but I think norms and rationality forms a significant part of influences to EU's decision making on foreign policy. I am not sure on the EU's foreign policy on Zimbabwe but generally I think the EU is normative in nature. I mean that rational norms override material interests in terms of a clash. Yes the EU can have material interests but if they collide with its norms, in most cases it is her norms that prevail. The norms are the policy of promoting human rights and democracy both within and outside the member states. There might be need for more research on to what

extend norms and self interests affect the EU's foreign policy maybe in relation to Africa and so forth.

Riddervold indicated that she was interested in discussing EU foreign policy in general and was not an expert on Zimbabwe in particular. Despite this, her comments were insightful. From this discussion it can be noted that one cannot simply argue that the EU has motives that have material interests. It is agreeable based from interviews quoted elsewhere in this book as well as from secondary data that the EU is an entity that has genuine desires to promote democracy and human rights as a foreign policy tool. What Riddervold indicated was that rational norms aimed at promoting human rights are a key part of the Union's motives in foreign policy. In the case of Zimbabwe it might be acceptable that the motives of the EU are intended to promote democracy first and then reap then material self interests when the democracy matures. Indeed it is a complex argument mirrored in realism versus liberalism. Liberalists argue that the EU promotes first and foremost human rights whilst the realists argue for the promotion of self interests by the block. It seems the EU goes for both in the case of Zimbabwe.

Foreign Policy differences within EU member states- A question of national interests?

As of now the EU is composed of 27 member states and the list is expected to grow in the immediate and medium terms. Such a massive number of member states has also meant that the EU's foreign and human rights policy towards Zimbabwe has been diluted despite all the vigorous attempts to present a single policy. In the recent past or recent decade there has been a clear division in some key nations in the EU on their approach towards the situation in Zimbabwe. The governments of the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and to some extent Germany and Denmark have been at diplomatic loggerheads due to policy differences on Zimbabwe. Their policy differences have given a clear lesson on the self interested geopolitical motives of the EU towards the country. Whilst the United Kingdom under Tony Blair (rivalled by Australia's John Howard) was the most hostile regime towards Zimbabwe since her

independence in 1980, the Chirac government in France was looking for an opportunity to swallow Zimbabwe into her geopolitical colonial style spheres of influence. Whilst the United Kingdom was campaigning to have the EU to support her tougher stance to isolate Zimbabwe, France was presenting herself to Zimbabwe as a reasonable broker in an attempt to push out the UK and paving the way for French influence. With the passage of time German and Denmark became tougher after some farms they claimed to be belonging to their nationals were reportedly seized by the authorities in Zimbabwe as part of the land reform programme. These two nations upped the stakes and threatened to sue Zimbabwe in international courts. This was probably good news to the UK as it helped the UK to have more allies to tighten the screws on Zimbabwe. The 2007 EU-Africa summit was delayed and almost cancelled over policy differences within the EU on Zimbabwe. Whilst the whole of Africa was united in saying that they will not attend the summit if Zimbabwe was not represented at the highest level, the EU was divided. Portugal as the host supported by the EU Commission President, Jose Manuel Barosso was in favor of the Zimbabwe President`s attendance. For its part, Portugal might have been interested in being successful during its term holding the EU presidency by hosting the EU-Africa summit. The Independent newspaper in the UK quoted Barosso as saying that "If international leaders decided not to go to those conferences involving countries which do not have reasonable human rights records, I'm afraid we would not be attending many conferences at all." (<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/barroso-defends-decision-to-invite-mugabe-to-conference-763585.html>). In the end the UK leadership boycotted the conference and posted a low level delegation. These lessons help in understanding the loopholes within the EU foreign and human rights policy on Zimbabwe. Such differences also strengthen the view that the EU is on the other hand composed of members not interested in pushing human rights and democratic tendencies in the world. Rather in a reasonable number of cases the EU member states have strong motivations to promote self interests in Zimbabwe and thus promote their long term political and economic returns whether human rights exist or not. The fact that the United Kingdom was beginning to mobilize the EU to sanction Zimbabwe

after the land repossession fiasco shows her interests in maintaining economic manipulation in Zimbabwe. The government of the UK never pressurized the government of Zimbabwe to speed up land reform since 1980 so that millions of landless rural peasants could realize their right to a dignified life with access to arable land and good harvests. The French interests in dispossessing UK of her influence in Zimbabwe were hardly the need to promote human rights and democracy. Rather both nations seemed to front their exploitative agenda for natural resources in Zimbabwe as Africa in general becomes the last frontier. Thus Andrew Mold and Sheila Page have noted that one concern to be raised now is precisely that in its dealings with developing countries the EU maybe moving towards a limited, business-like and mercantalistic approach, more akin to the USA model. (Mold A and Page S: 2007:19). In such cases like in Zimbabwe, the EU will erode its traditional soft power heritage which it badly needs to change situations in the developing nations.

More on the Complexities of the EU Motives in Zimbabwe:

An interview with one informant who was an active member of the Zimbabwe National Students Union whilst he was studying at the University of Zimbabwe helps in further understanding the complexities of understanding the motives of the EU in Zimbabwe. Victor Chimhutu was a student activist in the Zimbabwe National Students Union between 2000 and 2006. He studied a Psychology and Public Administration at the University of Zimbabwe and is currently studying for a Master in Gender in Development at the University of Bergen in Norway. The interview was conducted via email. I send him the questions on email on 17 April 2010 and he responded on 27 April 2010. I quote him at length as his views seem to be touching on some of the complexities on the human rights relations between the EU and Zimbabwe. He had this to say:

Question: What do you think are the negative and positive motives of the EU `s human rights policies towards Zimbabwe?

Victor Chimhutu: The history and context of the struggle of Zimbabwe ties it closely to the European Union. The most powerful nations in EU are basically the former masters

of many African economies; as such their intentions are always debatable. We have reached a point in history when destiny should be defined and not given. The blatant human rights abuses by the current regime in Zimbabwe especially from 2000 onwards is undeniable, in fact as part of the student leaders, I have braved this brutality not because it was easy but it was to be done. If a father fails to protect and provide, strangers will find their way in the house. The motives of such EU interventions always lead to unintended consequences detrimental to the local population, governance and growth. EU is not a neutral benefactor in the Zimbabwean issue and certainly Britain isn't. The dilemma we always face is of choosing. More often than not we choose the lesser and distant evil. Activism in Zimbabwe is defined by more or less one agenda; our inspirational figures and songs for the struggle are more or less the same across the (political) divide. Hence we adore Che Guevara, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Steve Biko, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, and Alfred Nikita Mangena and we all wish to defeat the neo-liberal agenda for a more sensitive and inclusive system. In short we cannot deny the self-serving bias of the EU's Human Rights policies on Zimbabwe. The policies ignore fundamental Human Rights of survival and justice and reinforce the predominance of a small proportion of the population. To me Mugabe has always adored socialism and a one party-state since the 1980s, what is different now is what he is aiming at and what he is challenging. Land and power structures?

Such are views from the youth and active human rights activists from Zimbabwe. Chimhutu's response is self explanatory. He reinforces one of the views that the EU is acceptable as a mediator in Zimbabwe because of its power and because it is a lesser threat than the current administration which thwarts basic and civilian human rights aspiration in almost every circumstance. He also touches on the issue this paper has defined as defining the nation of Zimbabwe, which is the land issue. If the EU is seen as vigorously responding to the situation in order to defend the interests of supposed former land owners who have been dispossessed, then the neutrality of the Union will be eroded. In the end the EU might gain in the short term when the people in Zimbabwe want its help for economic recovery but in the long term if the land issue is not resolved the country will be back to square zero and the well intentioned or hidden motives of the EU will be displaced as what has happened in today's Zimbabwe.

Again as can be noted from Chimhutu`s response the EU`s policy directions have led to some detrimentally unintended consequences against the civilian population. It might be today that the general people will think of the EU as a helper but when the dust settles many will pose and look back at what exactly where the motives of the EU in Zimbabwe. The significance of the European Union in Zimbabwe is well cherished. It is only up to the Union to do what an interviewee called Marianne Riddervold said: which is that the EU`s decisions should be based more on rational norms to promote human rights than on material interests.

Summary

To claim that the European Union`s human rights policy on Zimbabwe is driven purely by realism based explanations misses the point. Neither can one say the EU`s policy is purely based on liberal notions of the genuine interest to promote human rights in Zimbabwe. In fact this research found out that the EU is driven by both realistic and liberalistic democratic intentions in its human rights dealings with Zimbabwe. This research confirms that the EU has strong motivations to promote genuine human rights in Zimbabwe in as much as it has strong motivations to promote and defend its self interests manifested through economic investments and political interventions in Zimbabwe. As such the challenge is upon the Union to move in the direction which it claims to be going: which is to lean stronger on rational founding principles of the Union based on the genuine promotion of democracy and human rights in developing nations like Zimbabwe. By so doing the Union will have the potential to expand its global influence as more and more people might increase the belief that the Union is a neutral actor in international human rights affairs.

CHAPTER 4

Norway's Zimbabwe Human Rights Policy: Spreading Morality?

What does Norway want in Zimbabwe? What are the motives of this self proclaimed humanitarian superpower? How do her policies differ or mirror those of the EU?

Aiming to discuss the foreign and human rights policy motives of Norway is what this chapter intends to do. The discussion will attempt to dwell on foreign policy tools like the sanctions policy of Norway, the collaboration with Civil Society Organizations or NGOs, and the question of values and morals in international political relations of Norway towards Zimbabwe. The discussion will be framed within the context of the theories of international realism and rational or normative theories which proposes the position of moral and liberal values in a state's international relations. The Zimbabwean government's denial of the deterioration of the human rights situation in the country will also be deliberated within the context of its relations with Norway. Despite not having been a significant trading partner of Zimbabwe, it will be argued that Norway has long-term economic and strategic interests that it wants to gain in Zimbabwe and hence its decision to increase its influence in the country. Furthermore the work will explore the possibility that just as the EU, Norway is out there in Zimbabwe to pursue her self interests aimed at achieving hegemony and dominance as well as to secure places for future resource exploitation as the wave of globalization heats up. No one wants to be left behind. The paper will however not be blind to the possibilities that Norway sees Zimbabwe as a platform to advance her values of democracy, fairness and justice. Similarly this section will discuss the efficacy of the argument that Norway's motives in Zimbabwe are also tailored towards building the image of Norway as a peace and humanitarian superpower on the global stage. An interview with a former Norwegian Prime Minister will be presented and some of his views will be used in discussing different sections of the issues raised above. In addition some aspects of the Norwegian policies will be compared with those of the European Union.

The diagram below is a summary of the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy instruments towards Zimbabwe. These points will be expanded in the analytical discussion that follows.



Diagram 4a. Variables in Norwegian Foreign and human rights policy choices on Zimbabwe as will be discussed below.

My interview with Kjell Magne Bondevik on Norway's Human Rights Policy on Zimbabwe.

Mr. Bondevik was the Prime Minister of Norway from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005. He is the longest serving non-Socialist Prime Minister in Norway since 1945. He is now the President of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is located in Norway. I scheduled an interview with Mr. Bondevik via Tone Holme who is the Administrative Secretary at the Oslo Center. The interview took place on 25 March 2010 at the main Oslo Center offices.

Question: Mr. Prime Minister, Is Norway Promoting Self Interests in its Zimbabwe Human Rights Policy?

Kjell Magne Bondevik: I recall that i started fighting for Zimbabwe's development before her independence in 1980. Zimbabwe was ruled by Ian Smith and i remember that people were suffering there. The system of Ian Smith was almost the same as apartheid in South Africa. During my days as a youth leader in my political party, the Christian Peoples Party (Kristelige Folkelige Parti- KrF in the 1970s) i used to campaign for measures to support the liberation of Zimbabwe even if the Norwegian government during those years was not yet fully preoccupied with that issue as it was gaining momentum. We cooperated with the liberation movements in Zimbabwe to help them. We supported Robert Mugabe til independence and we had sympathy for him and the country but as time went on we saw that he was becoming a dictator. It was very sad.

The government in Zimbabwe became more and more dictatorial. They disregarded the respect for human rights. The opposition political parties became victims of attacks. Elections were being rigged and the economy was being mismanaged. We in Norway have solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe today but not with Robert Mugabe. We think that Mugabe should accept democracy. There are rampant human rights abuses, no media freedom, and no space for NGOs and we know there is dispute on land.

Question: So does it mean that Norway is promoting its self interests?

Kjell Magne Bondevik: Not at all. No. We are engaging in Zimbabwe for sympathy. We have sympathy with the people of Zimbabwe. We think they deserve freedom and realization of their democratic rights. We helped to fight Ian Smith and we are still interested in helping

Zimbabweans. It is positive that Morgan Tsvangirai became the Prime Minister and it brings hope that maybe he might be able to rebuild the country and strengthen democracy.

Question: Is Norway's human rights approach to Zimbabwe based on genuine belief in human rights and freedom ideals or something else?

Kjell Magne Bondevik: Norway has a genuine belief in human rights. Human rights are universal. Norway implements the human rights laws of the United Nations and this means that we have genuine belief for such principles. Norway is a country which fights for human rights. We depend on dialogue.

Question: What can Norway do to help in building democracy in Zimbabwe?

Kjell Magne Bondevik: We have to work with the government. We have to try to influence Robert Mugabe to have free and fair elections. We have to support Tsvangirai and Mugabe based on conditions that will bring democracy. Institutions that strengthen democracy should be built. There is need to support measures to have a strong judiciary, NGOs and parliament. Norway should support human rights dialogue with Zimbabwean government and the NGOs. We can offer development assistance on condition that it reaches the people. Corruption is an issue of major concern though. It is tragic that Robert Mugabe mismanages the resources of the country. We think neighboring countries especially South Africa can help on the situation in Zimbabwe.

Such was a brief of the interview i had with the former Norwegian Prime Minister at his new offices at the current Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is located in Oslo. There are many insights that can be learnt from what Bondevik said in relation to the motives of Norway in Zimbabwe. The tone sounded like Norway has genuine belief in helping the advancement of democracy in Zimbabwe. Chronicling the historical support that Norway gave in the fight for independence in Zimbabwe is something that many organizations have been quick to point out as a justification that the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy is aimed at purely helping peoples of the less developed nations and in this case Zimbabwe. Dismissing such assertions is a

challenge since it is known that Norway and most Scandinavian nations were instrumental in the supporting liberation movements in Zimbabwe. They offered moral support and sometimes temporary sanctuary to some independence fighters. If such arguments are to go by, then it will be hard for critics to ignore the Norwegian appeal that they are interested in genuine human rights development in Zimbabwe.

The Interview below was with a former student activist in Zimbabwe, Victor Chimhutu (who was introduced earlier in Chapter 3). He presents some points which mirrors and differs from those of the former Prime Minister.

Interview with Victor Chimhutu on Norwegian human rights policy motives towards Zimbabwe

Question: What do you think are the negative and positive motives of the EU and Norwegian human rights policies towards Zimbabwe?

Victor Chimhutu: Norway benefits from a system that undermines the fundamental rights of humanity. I don't know whether what is right for humanity is defined as human rights. I mean to say that, the world order, trade relations are skewed and are probably something that we can't deal with over a cup of coffee. The dividends from the hegemony mean a lot for Norway, its economy and its relations with other countries. As a single entity however, it is very difficult to see the cynicism in Norway's Human Rights policies towards Zimbabwe.

Just like Bondevik, Victor acknowledged the difficulty of seeing Norway as selfish in its dealings with Zimbabwe. Victor sees Norway as benefiting from a hegemonic system set up by other stronger powers over Zimbabwe. In other words he believes that stronger powers in the EU dominate Zimbabwe's economy and politics. Norway just benefits from a system established by the bigger powers in Zimbabwe. As the discussion below unfolds, it will be noted that I argue that both these views have some validity.

Norway's Sanctions Policy against Zimbabwe

Norway has aligned herself with the EU regarding sanctions on Zimbabwe and as such her stance is difficult to separate from that of the EU. Just like the EU Norway sees her sanctions regime as targeted sanctions aimed at the military, individuals in the government and a freeze of assets of the individuals and companies thought to be benefiting the named individuals. The Diagram below shows how Norway sees and defines the sanction she has placed on Zimbabwe.




Diagram 4s: Norway sees her sanctions against Zimbabwe as targeted against the military and certain individuals in the Zimbabwe government.

The table below is an extract from the Norwegian sanctions document on Zimbabwe. The table shows that Norway has drafted its sanctions as mainly targeted against institutions that repress human rights and democratic growth in Zimbabwe. In such a case the sanctions looks well meant and well drafted.

FOR 2003-08-15 nr 1050: Forskrift om særlige tiltak mot Republikken Zimbabwe

§ 3. Forbud mot salg mv. av våpen og relatert materiell

Det er forbudt å selge, levere, overføre eller eksportere, direkte eller indirekte, våpen og relatert materiell av enhver type, samt reservedeler til slikt materiell, til enhver fysisk eller juridisk person, enhet eller ethvert organ i, eller til bruk i, Republikken Zimbabwe. Forbudet gjelder uansett om varene har norsk opprinnelse eller

ikke.

§ 6. Unntak fra § 3 til § 5 for utstyr ment for humanitær bruk mv.

Som unntak fra § 3 til § 5 kan Utenriksdepartementet tillate:

- a) salg, levering, overføring eller eksport av
 - 1. ikke-dødelig militært utstyr, eller utstyr som kan bli brukt til nasjonal undertrykking og som står oppført i vedlegg I, som utelukkende er ment for humanitær bruk eller beskyttelse eller for internasjonale programmer for institusjonsbygging,
 - 2. materiell ment for internasjonale krisehåndteringsoperasjoner;
- b) finansiering og finansieringsbistand samt faglig bistand i tilknytning til utstyr som nevnt i bokstav a, såfremt de samme betingelser er oppfylt.

§ 7. Påbud om frysing og forbud mot å gjøre tilgjengelig midler mv.

Midler og økonomiske ressurser som tilhører de enkelte medlemmer av Republikken Zimbabwes regjering eller fysiske og juridiske personer, enheter og organer som har tilknytning til dem, som oppført på listen i vedlegg II til denne forskrift, skal fryses

Source: www.Lovdata.no

&3. Disallowing the sale of weapons and related material.

It is illegal to sale, deliver, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, weapons and related material of any type, as well as repair parts of such material, to any physical or judicial person, entity, or organ in or for use in the Republic of Zimbabwe. The illegality is valid whether the products have or have not their origins in Norway.

&6. Exceptions to &3 up to &5 for equipment meant for humanitarian use, etc.

As an exception to &3 up to &5 the foreign ministry can allow:

- (a). Sale, delivery, transfer or export of
 - 1. Non-dangerous military equipment which can be used in national repression and which are in the annex 1, but which is meant for humanitarian use or protection or for international programs for institutional building
 - 2. Material meant for international crisis management operations.
- (b). financing and financial aid as well as aid related to equipment mentioned in letter (a) and the same conditions should be fulfilled.

&7. Allowing freezing of assets and disallowing access to such assets.

Assets and economic resources that belongs to some members of the government of Zimbabwe or physical and judicial persons, entities and organs which have connections to them as it stands on the list in Annex II in this declaration, shall be frozen.

Source: www.Lovdata.no

Table 4 s. this table was made with information from the sanctions law against Zimbabwe of Norway which can be found at www.lovdata.no or in a book called Norges Lover (Norwegian Laws). The table is an extract of some paragraphs on sanctions against Zimbabwe imposed by Norway following the EU's lead.

The sanction language above is almost the same as the EU sanctions declaration on Zimbabwe. As discussed on the section on constraints to Norwegian foreign policy on Zimbabwe, the nature of the sanctions paper from Norway is an endorsement of the EU's position on Zimbabwe. It is difficult to see how Norway can ignore the EU when it is so important to her foreign policy interests. As such the motive of Norway for adopting such sanctions on Zimbabwe could have been fronted by the need not to go against the EU's foreign and security policy. As noted by the Norwegian mission to the EU, Norway is invited by the EU to align itself with some EU positions on foreign

and security policy issues. In this case Norway could have been fulfilling such a role. It is also difficult to see how Norwegian sanctions could have impacted Zimbabwe on their own without the combination of the EU sanctions. This is not to say that Norway does not matter to Zimbabwe. In fact it is because Zimbabwe has not been importing much weapons or related material from Norway and economically there has not been much trade between the two countries. However by imposing the sanctions Norway avoided being an alternative weapons import zone for the regime in Zimbabwe and that makes it significant that Norway adopted the EU measures. More so the imposition of sanctions by Norway offers a symbolic message to potential human rights violating nations that Norway will not be an accomplice or friend of wayward regimes. Norway's sanctions on Zimbabwe are therefore significant in that way. And such motivations could have driven Norway to adopt sanctions as a human rights policy against Zimbabwe.

In the discussion on the EU sanctions it was noted that despite labeling the sanctions as restrictive measures aimed at certain individuals, the sanctions have in reality hurt civilians and the economy of Zimbabwe. More over, the intended targets have not felt much of the sanctions effects except not visiting Norway and Europe. It is hard to see how banning a person from visiting Europe can make him/her suffer when the very same person continues to enrich him/herself. Zimbabwe has continued to import weapons from China, Russia, Iran, India, African countries, South Africa and Israel. The same capacity that Zimbabwe had in 1999 to suppress its people with weapons is the same capacity that it has today in 2010 and beyond. What is the argument here? The point is that sanctions as a policy do not always hurt the intended target. They hurt the ordinary people whether their name is "comprehensive", "smart" or "targeted". Cases of North Korea, Burma, Syria, Libya and many others prove the point. In those nations it was the ordinary people who suffered the most whilst their leaders were partying and merrying. In North Korea, Burma, Libya and Syria people have not started a war against their governments despite the long term sanctions imposed on those countries. In fact the sanctions have increased the justification by repressive regimes to punish anyone who goes against them on the pretext of punishing those

who collaborate with enemies of the state. Zimbabwe has not been an exception. Thus even if the Norwegian sanction policy had good intentions, its weaknesses are found in some of these reasons. There is still growing debate on the workability of sanctions in the academic and policy circles. However the challenge is that sanctions have been a success in achieving what John Mearsheimer and Patrick Morgan noted when they said that “the essence of international politics is competition for power, with power consisting ultimately of coercive capabilities (P Morgan in Collins, 2007:19) and that “great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal” (Mearsheimer: 2001:29). Sanctions have made it possible for greater powers to maintain their dominance and stop any potential rivals from emerging as economically and politically stronger powers. It is however unfortunate that a regime like the one in Zimbabwe has allowed the greater powers to have a justification to impose sanctions because of its allowance of a rogue democracy and a meandered human rights system.

Norway`s Civil Society Policy on Zimbabwe.

Bondevik pointed with passion how he believes that NGOs have a role to play in development of democracy in Zimbabwe. As noted in the interview brief above, Bondevik pointed out that Norway needs dialogue with the government of Zimbabwe and with the NGOs in order to promote democracy in this nation. It is very important to note that in the Norwegian system there is very strong relationship between the state and the NGOs. They collaborate on foreign assistance and on some international humanitarian missions. In most cases Norwegian based NGOs offer immediate international assistance to countries in crisis. My brief experience as a worker at the Doctors Without Borders in Norway (Leger Uten Grenser Norge) also helped to understand the NGOs in Norway a little bit more than I knew before. The significance of NGO-state relations can somehow be capture by this press release from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry: “The decision to increase humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe happens on encouragement from the UN emergency coordinator. The aid is primarily targeted towards food security and it will be distributed via organizations

like the Red Cross, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway, and Doctors Without Borders Norway. These are organizations that have a long engagement in Zimbabwe, and they have the competent channels needed to minimize the risk for misuse of the aid” (Foreign Ministry Press release number 39/10) (Beslutningen om å øke den humanitære bistanden til Zimbabwe skjer på oppfordring fra FNs nødhjelpskordinator. Bistanden er primært rettet mot matsikkerhet, og går gjennom organisasjoner som Røde Kors, Norsk Folkehjelp, Flyktninghjelpen, Redd Barna og Leger uten grenser. Dette er organisasjoner som har et langsiktig engasjement i Zimbabwe, og som har rutiner for gjennomføring og overvåkningssystemer på plass for å minimere risikoen for misbruk (Utenriks Departementet: Pressemelding Nr. 39/10). In a foreign policy speech the Norwegian foreign Minister clearly stated that Norway has a policy to carry out its activities through the support of NGOs. Jonas Gahr Støre pointed out that “Norway will continue its efforts in Zimbabwe in close cooperation with the other Nordic countries. We are providing substantial support for humanitarian assistance, and in 2008 our contribution amounted to NOK 67.7 million. Norway is also supporting civil society actors in the country and in the region. (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). By pursuing such a policy it might be argued that Norway has real humanitarian based interests in Zimbabwe. It can also be argued that Norway has the motive to use Zimbabwe as a lever to reaffirm its belief in promoting global humanitarian assistance to countries in need. In this policy Norway also attempts to affirm the role of civil society in international development. Thus the motive of working through NGOs in Zimbabwe might just be a genuine belief by Norway that NGOs are an indispensable partner in development issues. Even inside Norway herself NGOs perform various functions like working against drug abuses, against child abuse, promote family cohesion and several economic, political and economic activities. It is therefore a legitimate possibility that Norway has partnered with NGOs in pursuing its Zimbabwe policy solely in the belief that NGOs are a paramount development actor. Nevertheless Non- State Actors (NSAs) like NGOs have not been free from scrutiny of their independent motives vis a vis those of their home governments.

Globalization as a phenomenon has provided a chance for NGOs to attempt to be autonomous actors in international relations. Some NGOs have even demanded greater say than what countries in poorer nations have today. This is against a background whereby some NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have more financial muscles which are more than some governments in the developing world. NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and a host of others have been very critical of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. These NGOs positions have been supported by governments in the West like in Norway and the EU since their interests coincide regarding Zimbabwe. However it has been the level of hostility that the NGOs have exhibited against Zimbabwe that has called into question the motives of their alliances with the western governments. NGOs in Norway have been more vocal of events in Zimbabwe than they have been on their home government when it comes to immigration issues. Despite some shortcomings in the Norwegian immigration politics, the Norwegian NGOs have been moderately vocal against their government. When the NGOs in Norway criticize their government they rely on the moral conviction that their government will do the right thing. If the Norwegian government decides to ignore them and carry out a certain immigration policy, there is little that they can do to the government. However in relation to Zimbabwe and the generality of perceived dictator governments from the developing nations, these NGOs have been effective in using their alliance with their home governments. The NGOs have been effective in calling for sanctions against Zimbabwe and these sanctions have been successful in defeating what NGOs claim they want to achieve in Zimbabwe. The sanctions have led to economic decline and international isolation of Zimbabwe. If the purpose of the NGOs has been to create a humanitarian situation so that they can have more to do in Zimbabwe, then they might have been successful. Targeted sanctions are in theory a pragmatic idea, but in reality they do not produce the intended results. It will also be a long way to make people who matter to understand this position. This is because people from governments and NGOs who campaign for sanctions have not themselves been made to live under them and it is highly unlikely that they will experience any form of sanctions in the foreseeable future. This will therefore make it

difficult for such entities to understand that a sanctions policy is wholly immoral and defeats the course of development agendas. When the Wikileaks organization released some classified documents of the American government, it made the USA feel a bit of what it means to be infringed upon on matters of life and death (for both its military personnel and the general civilian population). Such damages or possibilities are what sanctions can do to a nation and its people. There is just need for a well thought out strategy before embarking on such decisions.

The link between democracy, globalization and NGOs has also been summed up by an extract from Magnus Bjørnsen's article. He noted that "In the face of globalization, African democracy faces two significant challenges. Firstly, a threat of what can be called "erosion from below". The mistaken perception that democracy and good governance also imply a weak state, has led to a myriad of NGOs and other actors who can be classified "civil society" infringing on what has traditionally been seen as the state's role, primarily in service delivery" (Magnus Bjørnsen :2008:93). This is a reality that has been happening in Zimbabwe. It seems the Norwegian government shares this misconception with the NGOs and hence the making of their alliance. The perception has been that Zimbabwe should show its democratic credentials by giving space to NGOs and other civil society actors. By refusing to do so the Zimbabwe administration has thus been labeled a pariah state. What is the motive of so doing by Norway and her NGOs? The possible motive can be that Norway has blinkered eyes which define a democracy as a country which mirrors the Norwegian thinking. It can be an attempt to force a western way of governance systems on Zimbabwe. The reality is that African states need democratically strong governments to maintain law and order. European governments were very strong and controlling of their populations til their development levels were such that people were more concerned with defending their newly won middle class status and freedom. When Europe developed to its current levels everyone understood the value of freedom and they did not want to lose it. As such countries like Zimbabwe need democratically strong governments as opposed to democratically weak governments which can collapse and thereby impede

the road to consolidated development. Norway's policy towards Zimbabwe might therefore be missing this point.

Norwegian Strategic Interests in Zimbabwe?

Having an assertive and self interested foreign policy has been the norm in realist thinking and Norway has not been an exception in the game. John Mearsheimer argued that "great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. The system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core" (Mearsheimer: 2001:29). On a realist basis Patrick Morgan similarly argued that "the essence of international politics is competition for power" (Patrick Morgan in Collins, 2007:19). So who says that Norway has no realist intentions to gain power? Indeed there is no possibility to dismiss the argument that Norway has motives to gain ground in Zimbabwe and therefore expand her influence in Africa. As Mearsheimer and Patrick Morgan highlighted it is the intention of nation states to compete for power in the international political system. Some may argue that Norway is not a great power and hence it does not fit Mearsheimer's category of great powers. This position does not hold sufficient strength since the notion of great power is absolute as well as relative. The absolute side is that it is generally accepted that the USA, China and Russia are great powers in the current international system. The relative side is that countries like the United Kingdom or France and Germany are greater powers as compared to countries like Portugal, Norway and The Netherlands. On a similar note Norway might see herself as a great power relative to most countries in Africa, Asia and some Latin American states. In this case her international politics towards Zimbabwe might be shaped by the thinking that she has the potential to fight it off for influence in Zimbabwe. Such a realist desire to expand her international influence in Africa through an assertive stance on human rights in Zimbabwe can be Norway's attempt to compete for global hegemony.

International diplomatic and political interventions in nations like Zimbabwe have not always been based on goodwill intentions by the western powers. To say that most of

the interventions by western nations in areas like Africa and Zimbabwe are purely humanitarian misses the reality. An argument by Hilde Frafjord Johnson assists in making sense of this argument. Hilde Johnson noted that “It is still fair to say that the engagement of the international community in Africa has largely been based on individual strategic interest, geo-political positioning, scramble for resources and power. Even progressive Nordic donor countries, Norway included, tied aid and set of returns from their assistance as an operational goal as late as the mid-nineties (Hilde Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 29). She further says that “Hardly any actors were engaged in Africa for Africa’s sake (Hilde Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 29). Thus as she noted Norway is part of the international competition for resources and dominance of the developing nations like Zimbabwe. Magnus Bjørnsen aligns to this position by admitting that “It is indeed true that several of the policy changes which can benefit Africa in the future should be motivated in our own long term interests, rather than as altruism or charity vis-avis the African continent (Magnus Bjørnsen: 2008: 95). The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs weighed in by stating that “I believe we must have the courage to discuss our own interests in the world. We must learn more about how the various goals and needs of Norwegian society are challenged by globalization, and how they can best be met” (Jonas Gahr Støre: 2008: Foreword). It is therefore legitimate to think that despite the good intentions to the people of Zimbabwe; Norway has not been left behind in the process of the fight to gain resources of the country. The situation in Zimbabwe makes it difficult for countries like Norway to extract resources and to open new markets for their finished products. As such advocating a human rights policy which prefers a change from one government to another can hide suspicions of advancing her long term political and economic benefits.

A country like Zimbabwe has been in an unfortunate position like many developing countries, whereby developed powers attempt to indirectly rule her by imposing their political will by any means necessary. This thinking is a continuation of the colonial era style in which nations like the United Kingdom and France treated African nations as pawns designed to fulfill their own interests. Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru noted

that “Africa’s current marginal position in the global economy must be placed in a historical context – i.e. its colonial past and the manner in which the continent was integrated into the post 1945 world order” (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru :2008:98). With the wave of globalization taking place, nations like Norway have joined the race for resources and markets and thereby pursuing human rights as indirect ways to achieve the political goals. Nordberg and Cheru goes onto to say that “More than any other region in the world, Africa has paid a high price for the globalizing policies of rival capitalist powers as they strived to expand the geographic bounds of capital (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru: 2008: 98). Nordberg and Cheru’s arguments are indeed critical in understanding the Norwegian motives in Zimbabwe. The intention by Norway to expand her geographic bounds of capital to Zimbabwe is a real possibility. Norway has money it needs to invest elsewhere and as such political control and transformations of countries like Zimbabwe offers long term possibilities to experiment such projects before finally securing such interests. It is no wonder therefore that the administration in Zimbabwe has been drumming up support locally and from African nations based on the campaign against the expansion of capitalism intended to devour Zimbabwe’s resources. This exposes the deficits of manipulating a good cause such as promoting human rights with promoting self interests of well off states like Norway.

Trade, Aid, and Economics as Norwegian Human Rights Policies

Significant economic trade between Norway and Zimbabwe has not been recorded though aid through NGOs and other government agencies like NORAD has been key in Norwegian foreign relations with Zimbabwe. Can it be said that Norway’s policies on Zimbabwe are based on advancing her economic interests in the country? Such a proposition is challenging to sustain in historical terms since trade volumes between Norway and Zimbabwe have been low. However with the new wave of globalization it is within range to suspect that Norway’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe has the hallmarks of intending to gain long term economic and resource interests in Zimbabwe. Norway has not been shy in supporting a government which is an alternative to the post independence administration in Zimbabwe. Even though

Norway has mainly argued on the basis that it supports a government that promotes human rights and democracy, it cannot be dismissed that economic interests lie behind part of her policies towards Zimbabwe.

When Norway announced that she was interested in investing Zimbabwe in May 2009, the news was greeted as welcome by the media and government in Zimbabwe. After Erik Solheim, the Norwegian Minister for International Development was one of the first senior western delegates to visit Zimbabwe in nearly a decade; a Norwegian investment team planned a visit to Harare. The investment team was from various stakeholders including the Norwegian Investment Fund (NORFUND) with its investment director being Kjartan Stigen, a former economist and counselor at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Zimbabwe (<http://allafrica.com/stories/200905181536.html>). However when the Harare government started to debate an indigenization bill for economic empowerment of the local population in businesses, the Norwegian investment delegation announced that they will not invest in Zimbabwe if such a bill was passed. Despite the Indigenization bill's shortcomings, the Norwegian position is a classic example whereby economic policies of the powerful nations are meant to expand their capitalistic hegemony in Africa on their own terms. Such action raises doubts about the real intentions of developed nations towards countries like Zimbabwe. It is agreeable that no entity would like to invest its funds were they will be misappropriated. At the same time it can be remembered that after Norway discovered oil, she quickly put compulsory measures to make sure that the oil will benefit Norwegians and not the big business empires from the USA or the United Kingdom. Norway's actions regarding its oil resources are commendable. Norway has shown that a nation can develop by guarding its resources and making laws that ensure local ownership of the resources as was the case with her oil discoveries in the 1960s and 1970s. When Zimbabwe tries to do the same thing for its diamonds, mines and agricultural resources, a country like Norway strongly denounces it as dictatorial. What then are the motives behind such a policy? What then will make nations like Zimbabwe own their resources and thereby decide

their destiny? What can a nation like Zimbabwe do to challenge such tendencies from the international community of developed nations? Can Zimbabwe pursue a similar policy as it did in redressing the colonial origin land imbalances? Such questions are easy to answer. An agreement with developed nations like Norway that there is no option to Zimbabwe's development except to let her own her resources and assist her with the technical requirements can lead to progressive development in the country. Such will be genuine development assistance as opposed to aid that makes recipients beg more and more. Under such circumstances it is a challenge to defend the impossibility that Norway has long term economic interests to pursue in Zimbabwe. It remains therefore a strong reason to believe that the long term strategy of Norway's policy planners might be to gain a foothold in Zimbabwe at an early stage in the hope that it might provide the much needed resources in future as Africa becomes the last frontier.

Zimbabwe's Denials and Interventions of International Norwegian Diplomats

Norwegian interventions in Zimbabwe have taken various forms including both localized and internationalized channels. The situation in Zimbabwe has necessitated Norway to attempt to involve herself more in the country. However the dire political and economic conditions in the country were not being seen in the same light by Zimbabwe's government and the Norwegian government. The two sides interpreted the situation in the country differently, maybe at least in public. A top Norwegian Diplomat, Jan Egeland, working as the United Nations Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs during the period when Zimbabwe embarked on a cleanup exercise called Operation Murambatsvina, summed up the thinking of the then Zimbabwean government. I attempted to have an interview with Mr. Jan Egeland but his communications secretary told me he was out on duty when I tried to schedule for a meeting and she gave me a copy of an article he wrote in the book entitled "A billion Lives". A paragraph I quote from that article when Egeland talked to the President of Zimbabwe helps to show that the government in Zimbabwe was in a state of denial

regarding the degree of difficulties facing the country during that time. At the same time it shows that Norway's Egeland saw things differently from Mugabe. This is what Jan Egeland had to say:

“---- In an ante-room of the Presidential palace- I know this will be one of the most difficult missions and meetings ever. Nearly two years earlier my predecessor, Kenzo Oshima, a more polite and diplomatic envoy than I, had been kept waiting for hours in the presidential antechambers before being lectured for an hour about UN shortcomings. The UN is politicized Mugabe says because it is dominated by Britain and its stooges among whom I, a Norwegian, am soon accused of being one. "It is clear to us that the UN is being used by Britain for political purposes," he repeats. "That is why we are sensitive to your own presence." (Jan Egeland: 2008).

Egeland goes on to note that: “There is a free fall in life expectancy from more than 60 years in the early 1990s to between 30 and 40 today. The eviction campaign and the agricultural policies of the government have been "the worst possible things at the worst possible time" and have contributed to changing the country from being the breadbasket of the region with admirable standards of living to widespread starvation unless there is massive international assistance. (Jan Egeland: 2008).

The Norwegian government's recent view of the situation in Zimbabwe can be summed up with a statement from a speech on foreign policy by the Norwegian foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre: “Zimbabwe has been heading towards total collapse for a long time. Prime Minister Stoltenberg has, on behalf of Norway, repeatedly called on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) to play a more active role in efforts to find a solution to the situation. We welcome the agreement to establish a unity government in Zimbabwe. But profound changes are needed in many of the country's policies before a normalization of its relations with the international donor community can be expected” (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb 2009).

Egeland's and Støre's analysis of the situation in Zimbabwe as dire is and remains undeniable. It can be noted from what Egeland is saying that the government in Zimbabwe was concerned with shifting blame from itself and put it on the UN and the

UK. It is also undeniable that the United Kingdom has its own share of the burden in the dire economic, social and political situation in Zimbabwe. It is also an issue that many developing countries feel that the United Nations system needs a reformation. However it should be noted that by pointing out its frustration with the UN and the UK, the government of Zimbabwe was embarking on abrogation of its responsibilities on the deterioration in the country. It was an attempt to divert attention from the real problems on the ground and trying to attract sympathy from African and developing nations who might have similar thinking. Thus Egeland's meeting with Mugabe helps in understanding the difficulties of engaging in a zone where the leaders deny their responsibilities. It could have been possible for the government in Zimbabwe to have refused to meet Egeland as the UN envoy. The expectation that as a Norwegian he might be less combative might have led them to accept a meeting with him. Norway has been successful in having her citizens serving as top diplomats in international organizations. There have also been attempts by Norway to use its citizens working in such positions to advance her interests as a peace builder and thereby expand her influences. Jan Egeland might have been one such individual in Norwegian policy interests and interventions in Zimbabwe.

It is possible that if Jonas Gahr Støre's position on Zimbabwe was that the country was heading towards a total collapse was true, then the pressure by Norway might be a genuine endeavor to raise attention to the situation in Zimbabwe and an attempt to prevent the collapse. If that is the case then the intention of Norway might be on the side of ordinary people who are experiencing the consequences of the decline in Zimbabwe. Norway has also attempted to promote a way forward in Zimbabwe by actively being a member of a so-called "Friends of Zimbabwe" group which held its recent meeting in Oslo in June 2010. After the meeting the Norwegian foreign Ministry released a short statement noting that: "the meeting was successful in coming up with a resolution and there was agreement on a new multi donor support fund for Zimbabwe in collaboration with the African Development Bank" (*Møtet lyktes i å komme fram til en samstemt erklæring, og det ble enighet om støtte til et nytt*

flergiverfond for Zimbabwe i regi av Afrikabanken) (Utenriks Departementet : Nyhet 03.06.2010). This is just an example of how Norway has attempted to pressure for human development in Zimbabwe through various channels which she has access to. Her intentions might well be multifaceted including both genuine desire to help people in Zimbabwe or to spruce her image as a voice for justice and fairness.

Zimbabwe - A Platform for Norwegian Moral Strategic Values?

That moral and strategic values forms part of the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy towards Zimbabwe is a strong possibility. Advancing her moral and humanitarian thinking has been a critical part of Norwegian foreign policy though it has not been easy to dissect the dividing line between self interests and moral interests. Nils Butenschøn gives a helping insight on this thinking. Nils noted that “ There are variations of idealist conceptions which prescribe active foreign policy on behalf of universal moral standards of humanity and justice, Norway`s interests are best served if its policy contributes to peace and justice in the world, both within and outside its own region” (Nils A Butenschøn: 1997:13). On a morally sided note Magnus Bjørnsen also pointed out that “It is correct that there can be a Norwegian extended self-interest in a global policy which fights poverty” (Magnus Bjørnsen: 2008:95). If the Norwegian foreign policy can be seen as designed to promote international moral standards, then her involvement in Zimbabwe can be serving just that purpose. Norway has been pressing regional governments in Africa especially the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to help in ending the political and humanitarian challenges in Zimbabwe. Other governments from the EU and elsewhere have been doing the same. However it seems Norway has more belief than the EU that SADC can be important in Zimbabwe in contrast to what the EU thinks. The EU is of the view that SADC is helpful only if it helps to arrive at an agreement which the EU likes. On the other hand Norway seems to have a position which is open and softer than the EU. However to make such distinctions is not always easy and it is therefore advisable to monitor the political developments as they unfold. Norway can be a bridging point on Zimbabwe`s relations with the western world if she uses the moral

and humanitarian card as she has done before in Sri Lanka and Palestine (Oslo Accords). Internal circumstances in Norway can also be an explanation for the moral motives in her foreign and human rights policy.

A need to succumb to the values of her population might also be affecting Norwegian foreign policy. Norwegians have generally been seen as placing responsibility for their lives on their social democratic governmental system. The social welfare model in Norway might like to pay back its citizens by giving them an opportunity to influence foreign policy. The general public in Norway is seen not as advocating for a militant foreign policy. Their government might therefore want to carry the voice of its people. The foreign Minister of Norway captured this position when he noted that “I don’t think that there is anyone who will disagree with former Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund’s thinking that “foreign policy is no longer a field for the few, for the experts and a small group of politicians. It affects everyone in their daily lives. Therefore, people must be given the opportunity to get involved in foreign policy decisions” (Jonas Gahr Støre: 2008 Foreword). By being softer on Zimbabwe than the EU, the Norwegian government might be responding to the general mood of its population which favors dialogue. More so it should be noted that Norway’s achievements in foreign policy depend on a perception of her as peaceful from the outside world. It depends on sympathy given that the EU, NATO and USA strongly affect Norwegian options in international politics.

Advocating a policy that minimizes escalation of tensions in Zimbabwe might explain the foreign policy motive of Norway of maintaining international peace and security. Norway’s survival depends on peace and stable security. Nils Butenschøn thus quoted an argument in her article which noted that “There is a more defensive orientation based on the idea that the best foreign policy a country like Norway can have is NOT to have a foreign policy at all, not to show too much in the landscape, because Norway is totally dependent on sympathy from the outside world. Norway should avoid conflict and if possible contribute to building bridges between adversaries who

otherwise could threaten Norway`s security, and to the establishment of an international legal order that protect small states” (Nils A Butenschøn: 1997:13). It is therefore an indissmissible probability that Norway`s policy regarding Zimbabwe is based on the desire to maintain international peace and security. To achieve this objective it is important that Norway actively promotes democracy and human rights in nations like Zimbabwe. It might therefore be the reason why the current Norwegian policy is to support the coalition government in Zimbabwe today as expressed by a press release statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which noted that *“Norge støtter fortsatt samlingsregjeringen I Zimbabwe, men er bekymret over den ustabile situasjonen I landet. For Norge er det fortsatt viktig å støtte arbeidet med a sikre befolkningens demokratiske rettigheter, stanse politisk vold, styrke lovverk knyttet til menneskerettigheter og demokrati samt pressefrihet”* (Norway`s still supports the coalition government in Zimbabwe, but it is worried about the prevailing unstable situation in the country. It is important to continue supporting the work to secure the people`s democratic rights, stop political violence, strengthen laws related to human rights and democracy as well as press freedoms) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Press release Nr. Unr/2010). Thus the Norwegian mission in Zimbabwe might be aimed at preventing deterioration in the country and thereby increase chances of a peaceful resolution of the conflict the country. Norway has invested a lot in trying to portray herself as a peace builder and as a champion of humanitarian undertakings. Zimbabwe might be one such chance for Norway to strengthen its endeavors of an image as a peace loving nation.

Constraints on Norwegian foreign policy due to NATO, the USA and the EU`s Common Security Policy

Norwegian interests are closely linked to developments in the North and our neighboring areas and they are safeguarded through transatlantic solidarity and our close integration with the EU and our Nordic and European partners (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). This pronouncement from the Norwegian foreign Minister in a foreign policy speech in February 2009 nearly sums up the constraints to Norwegian foreign policy and consequently her human rights policy

towards Zimbabwe. As Jonas Gahr Støre noted, Norway's interests can be influenced by the need not to antagonize ties with the various blocks like NATO, USA and EU. Støre went further to say that "the US is Norway's most important ally" and that "NATO has been a cornerstone of Norway's security policy since 1949" (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). Under such circumstances it can be learnt that the Norwegian policy towards Zimbabwe operates within the need to maintain closer ties with NATO and the US as well as the EU. It should be noted that the sanctions policy of Norway towards Zimbabwe closely mirror those of the EU and the USA. The EU member states and the USA form the bulk of powerful deciders of issues in NATO, in which Norway is also a member. Thus if Norway fails to toil the lines wanted by the powerful USA and EU blocks then it will be very difficult to see how Norway expects help from these nations for its potential security dilemmas in case of a dispute with Russia in the North seas. Norway also has to corporate on economic interests via the European Economic Area (EEA) and this poses probable challenges in pursuing an independent foreign policy towards Zimbabwe which is different from that of the EU. The Norwegian mission to the EU highlighted that "Norway is not part of the EU's Common and Security Policy. However, Norway has regular political dialogues with the EU on various foreign policy issues and is regularly invited to align itself with EU foreign policy statements" (Norwegian Mission to the EU: July 2010). On a closely similar note the Norwegian foreign Minister pointed out that "the EEA Agreement and our broad cooperation with the EU are important ties for Norway as we meet the forces of globalization. One of Norway's foreign policy priorities is to safeguard these ties at a time when the EU is both changing and being enlarged (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). What do these statements serve to explain? These public policy statements from the Norwegian foreign missions and ministry serves to highlight that Norway is not totally independent from the EU and NATO when making foreign policy preferences and this also applies to its Zimbabwe policy. It is difficult to see how Norway can force its way on taking a purely different position on Zimbabwe when big EU members like the

United Kingdom are totally against a softening of relations with Zimbabwe until conditions are what they wish them to look like.

Despite the constraints to her foreign policy posed by USA, EU and NATO, Norway does not necessarily have to have the same views as those of these blocks. As the Norwegian foreign Minister noted “just as under the previous administration, our (Norway`s) interests will often coincide with those of the USA. But Norwegian views will occasionally differ from US views under Obama`s administration as well” (Jonas Gahr Støre: Foreign Policy Speech: Feb. 2009). This means that despite the pressure from other powerful allies of Norway, the Norwegian foreign policy will have some small space to air its different positions and views on certain policy issues. Such spaces are normally available if democracies of the same kind interact as is the case between Norway and these blocks. Norway has thus been innovative in utilizing that limited gap to pursue different policy approaches towards Zimbabwe. This has for example seen Norway leaning more in favor of dialogue with Zimbabwe. Bondevik was clear in my interview with him that Norway depends on dialogue and that he hoped the situation in Zimbabwe will be resolved through an amicable dialogue between the EU, Norway and Zimbabwe.

It can be noted therefore that the Norwegian foreign and human rights policy position on Zimbabwe can be motivated by the desire to keep strong ties with its EU, NATO and American allies. It can also be possible that Norway wants to identify with the values of its western allies and therefore she cannot be left behind whilst others agree on isolating Zimbabwe. Thus even if Norway was not interested in being too tough on Zimbabwe, it will be difficult to do that when she prioritizes her cornerstone relations with her ally groups. However despite the constraints, Norway has managed to diplomatically utilize the space available to relatively weaker nations by claiming her western democratic right to have independent views. This right has been difficult to argue against and as such Norway use this right to do things differently. Her efforts to champion humanitarian rights are part of the Norwegian strategies to force her views

on the agendas of the more realist and aggressive nations like the USA and semi aggressive blocks like the EU.

Summary

An approach which has seen Norway pursuing both self interests and moral values has been a key nature of the Norwegian human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. This policy has seen the use of sanctions, aid, NGOs, international connections and other related tools in Norway`s relations with Zimbabwe. However despite having a sanctions policy motivated by the demands of the European Union, Norway has been able to portray itself as a nation that prefers to promote dialogue with Zimbabwe. This is an aspect that differentiate her from the more aggressive and tough stance of the EU on Zimbabwe. However Norway`s policies are constrained by its relations and alliances with NATO, the EU and the USA. Such alliances have motivated Norway to follow these countries in some aspects of her Zimbabwe policy. Consequently some Norwegian positions on Zimbabwe have been motivated by the need to preserve her strong ties with the EU and to preserve her international political interests.

Conclusion

Seeking a way forward

Relational dilemmas between the EU and Zimbabwe have hopes in the dialogue mechanisms agreed to in the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP nations. In that agreement Zimbabwe and the EU can hope to mend their strained relations and in the process assist in rebuilding Zimbabwe. Karin A. (2005:156) noted that “the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, strongly aims to expand the phenomenon of political dialogue. Much more explicitly than before, the Cotonou Agreement posits political dialogue as a firm pillar of the ACP-EU partnership, alongside development assistance and economic trade relations (article 2)”. It can thus be observed that this agreement offers possibilities for negotiations between parties in cases of disagreements. In such negotiations both parties should fulfill their obligations as agreed to in the deal. In this case it will need sustained efforts to achieve an agreeable understanding between the EU and Zimbabwe. In terms of achieving human rights and democracy standards, Zimbabwe is far from reaching that target. On a similar note the EU is far from offering the financial and technical aid it has been promising for far long a time. So what can Zimbabwe do and what can the EU do? The European Union needs to engage with Zimbabwe with an open mind. The EU should stop dictating and expecting outcomes that only satisfy their position. Furthermore if the EU is seen to be advocating for policies that do not improve the general access to natural resources by the majority of the population in Zimbabwe, then its intentions will remain suspicious. In such cases the success of the EU will be hard to envisage. Ignoring the centrality and urgency of the land politics in Zimbabwe will be at the peril of any efforts to solve the human rights and democracy deficits in Zimbabwe. Any agreements under the Cotonou dialogue processes should take into account the question of land reform, sustainable development, justice and equality in Zimbabwe. If the EU mainstreams these aspects, in addition to human rights and democracy, then chances are high that they will achieve a deal that will see Zimbabwe back on the positive development path again. On the part of Zimbabwe, what should

she do? Nordberg and Cheru provided some applicable advice to Zimbabwe. They noted that “those countries that can resist externally dictated solutions and implement independent development strategies are in a much better position to achieve development than those who cannot. The key to African countries in today`s world is to try to weave through the parameters set by the world economy and maintain as much independence or `policy space as possible. In the process, they would do well to support efforts aimed at seeing the current unjust international system in a more just direction” (Carin Nordberg and Fantu Cheru: 2008:105). This is a very important way forward for Zimbabwe. If Zimbabwe can achieve as much economic and political independence as possible from the EU and any foreign powers, then it can be in a better position to chart a progressive development path. By continuing to be economically dependent on the EU and other global capital enterprises, Zimbabwe will always fall down. If Zimbabwe remains in the armpits of the EU, then it will mean that the EU can open or close the levers of life in Zimbabwe whenever it views the situation as being unfavorable to her strategic interests.

Norway- Zimbabwe relations can be improved through more bilateral engagements which can foster deeper understanding of the differences between their perspectives of the situation in Zimbabwe. Norway is not part of the EU but she can use her closer relations with the EU to push for the EU to engage with Zimbabwe. If relations between EU and Zimbabwe improve, the same will translate to her relations with Zimbabwe. The Norwegian position which favors dialogue should be strengthened in relation to the situation in Zimbabwe. Financial and sustainable aid to Zimbabwe can be provided by both Norway and the EU in a way that does make Zimbabwe depended on them day in and day out. This means that aid should not be for one off events like food and one off vaccination programmes. Sustainable aid is that which will make the recipient nation liberated from future dependency. Thus Hilde F Johnson noted that “the international community must reform its approach to Africa. Delivering on aid commitments is important and building peace and building stronger states. Norway should play an important part in making that happen” (Hilde Frafjord Johnson: 2008: 42). Building stronger states and building peace can only be achieved by committing

aid that makes nations economically and politically self reliant in future without burdening the tax payers from the developed nations. It is acknowledgeable that such positions are hard to achieve considering that in realist international relations greater powers always seek to dominate weaker nations and their rivals. It is therefore a challenge to see the EU and Norway subscribing to the idea of adopting a policy that will empower a country like Zimbabwe today since they think it might challenge their dominance tomorrow. However it should be noted that an economically prosperous Zimbabwe can become a vibrant democracy which can never pose a serious threat to other democracies like those in EU and Norway. The liberals have argued for such a position and if Zimbabwe is supported economically it will improve its human rights record and thereby become a friend of the European democracies for good. It will become the family of nations who strives to promote global values on democracy and human rights in future.

Summarizing

Consequences of the policies of the EU and Norway have been sometimes constructive and at times retrogressive to the human rights and development situation in Zimbabwe. Where the European Union and Norway have pursued self interested agendas to promote their political and economic interests, the effects have been negative on Zimbabwe as well as the EU and Norway themselves. By imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe the EU and Norway have played a significant role in decaying the Zimbabwean economic, social and political development. The sanctions have led to the international isolation of Zimbabwe as well as to the freezing of all meaningful channels of international financial assistance. The government of Zimbabwe has exploited the imposition of sanctions as a political tool to argue that the EU is applying sanctions as a way of forcing Zimbabwe to surrender her natural resources to western imperial capitalism. This argument has been helpful in sustaining the rule of the government in Zimbabwe despite evident human rights abuses that have been witnessed under its tenure in office. Most nations from the developing continents, especially African nations have been resolute in defending Zimbabwe as a victim of

western realist and capitalist expansion agenda. As such the EU and Norwegian sanctions on Zimbabwe have been far from being successful despite their alleged intention to force an adherence to human rights standards in Zimbabwe.

Civil society organizations have been a key instrument of Norwegian and EU human rights policy towards Zimbabwe. It has been clear that these NGOs have been utilized by Norway and the EU to front their policy motives in Zimbabwe. The NGOs have been a cornerstone in offering humanitarian aid and in supporting local human rights groups in the country. They have also been busy exposing massive human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and thereby influencing policy directions from the EU and Norway. In their alliance with Norway and the EU to offer humanitarian aid and expose rights violations in Zimbabwe, the NGOs have been a success tool to promote the human rights and democratic ideals of the western societies. In so doing the motives of the EU and Norway can be understood to be a desire to partner NGOs and spreads their democratic ideals in Zimbabwe. Despite these noble motives it has also been noted that the EU-Norway-NGO partnership has some desires to maintain the European hegemony over Zimbabwe and thereby fulfill the realist philosophy of the desire to dominate weaker nations. NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Crisis Group International have been key in advocating for the isolation and sanctioning of Zimbabwe. By so doing they have been a hand in pushing for the deterioration of living, economic, political and social standards in the country. Advocating for a tougher stance via isolation and sanctions contributed to increased brutality by the government of Zimbabwe against perceived enemies to its rule. In the ensuing battle it has been mostly civilians who suffered. As such it can be highlighted that the EU and Norway partnered NGOs to advance their motives to promote democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe in as much as they were using them to maintain and force their economic and political control of Zimbabwe.

Economic and trade relations between EU-Norway and Zimbabwe have been part of the jigsaw puzzles that shaped the motives of the EU and Norway. In most cases it was noted that the EU has large investment firms and interests in Zimbabwe which they

have tried to protect by sanctioning Zimbabwe after perceiving her as a threat to its economic and strategic interests. Most of these investments have been in the agriculture, mining, industry, tourism and service sectors. By embarking on the land reform programme, Zimbabwe was seen as teaching a wrong lesson to other former African colonies with similar dilemmas. To safeguard their economic interests through Africa and former colonial nations, the EU member states imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to a combination of both human rights violations and the land reform exercise. Arguably it was the land repossession programme which led the EU to take action against Zimbabwe. In such a case it can be argued that this policy was motivated by the desire to protect European political and economic interests in Zimbabwe more than it had to do with human rights issues. It can also be noted that the politics in the EU are also motivated by the desire to cover for each other in areas considered a member state's sphere of influence. In this case the EU might have been assisting the United Kingdom to protect her long term economic interests in Zimbabwe in return for the UK's mutual support to French, Portuguese or Spanish foreign policy interests in similar cases elsewhere in the world.

Norway has not been a key economic or trading partner with Zimbabwe. However this does not mean that she does not have economic interests in Zimbabwe. With the wave of globalization sweeping across the earth, Norway is trying to experiment expanding her economic wings into emerging and developing nations like Zimbabwe. Africa is seen as a center for future resource extraction and as such the battle is continuing to try to occupy areas of future exploitation. Zimbabwe is probably seen by Norway as such an area and it can be the reason why Norway has began sending some investment delegations to Zimbabwe to assess entry points into the potentially vast mining, agricultural, industry and banking sectors in the country.

In many respects Norway and the EU's policies on Zimbabwe have been similar. Aspects like sanctions, promoting genuine human rights and attempts to promote their moral and rational values in Zimbabwe have motivated both their foreign and human rights policies on Zimbabwe. However it has been noted that the Norwegian approach

has favored dialogue with Zimbabwe in resolving the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. The EU talks dialogue only on its own terms as opposed to Norway which sounds more open minded about the agenda for dialogue. The Norwegian Minister for International Development was among the first senior western officials to visit Zimbabwe after the signing of the coalition agreement in the country. This was a strategy by Norway to pre-empt any attempts by the EU to reject the outcome of the coalition agreement. After Norway, and then Sweden went to meet the coalition partners in Zimbabwe, the EU was left with little option except to follow suit by sending a low level EU delegation after some months. It can thus be noted that the motives of Norway in Zimbabwe are, more than the EU, designed to promote stability and human development in Zimbabwe.

That both Norway and the EU's motivations in Zimbabwe forms part of their broader strategic economic and political interests is undeniable. It is also problematic to deny that both the EU and Norway view Zimbabwe as a platform to promote their western ideals of democracy, human rights, individual freedoms, the freedom of the media, and the notion of free and fair elections. The Zimbabwe of today as been found wanting on most of these ideals. As such intervention by nations like Norway and groupings like the EU are welcome when a government renegades on the responsibility to protect its citizens. When a government devours the citizens it is supposed to protect solely because they have a different political opinion, then the international community will be responsible if they don't stop such abuses. The civil society too has a duty to expose and if possible employ powers within their means to stop human rights abuses. If the EU, Norway and the civil society organization's interventions in Zimbabwe were to assume such responsibilities to protect after the failure of the government in Zimbabwe, then their efforts could have been cherished. In situations where nation states denounce human rights abuses only if their economic and political interests are threatened, then the motives and morality of so doing will remain a betrayal to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights upon which the United Nations system was created to protect so that people can enjoy peace, security, stability and their individual choices.

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